INTEC CPP-659 lies within the 100 year flood plain. (INEEL 1/18/01 letter to K. Kelly, IDEQ from Ronald Guyman, Director of INEEL Environmental Affairs). The calculated water elevation used by the Engineering Design File (EDF) for a 100 year flood including breach of Mackay Dam is 4916 feet. (EDF-1747, 12/01/00, p. 3). (Also see, Attachment A, Koslow (1986) map of 100-year flood that encompasses the INTEC). Peak flood elevations at INTEC are in dispute by United States Geological Survey (1998 USGS) and other studies as well as the HLW/EIS (discussed more fully below) which consider the maximum probable flood.
The USGS (1998) study summarizes numerous prior studies with differing conclusions about the possible flood wave elevation and notes at page 6:
"Niccum (Aerojet Nuclear Company, written communication, 1973), Druffel and others (1979), Nobel (1980), and Koslow and an Haaften (1986) examined the hypothetical failure of Mackay Dam and the behavior of flood waves downstream. If Mackay Dam failed, Niccum estimate that peak flow at the ICPP would be about 30,000 cfs. He indicated that the present channel and old flood channels of the Big Lost River would convey about 20,000 cfs. Druffel and others (1979) estimated that the peak flow resulting from the dam failure would be 54,000 cfs at the western INEEL boundary ( about 45 miles downstream from the Mackay Dam). Nobel (1980) used a two dimensional model with cells 530 foot on a side, to simulate a peak flow in the area from the western INEEL boundary to the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). He estimated that the depth of water at the RWMC resulting from the failure of Mackay Dam would be 6 feet. Koslow and Van Haaften (1986) estimated that peak flow would be 45,000 cfs at the southern INEEL boundary and 4,440 cfs at Birch Creek Playa near the [Test Area North] TSF and CTF. Rathburn (1989, 1991), estimated the depth of water at the RWMC, resulting from a paleoflood of 2 to 4 million cfs in the Big Lost River in Box Canyon and overflow areas, was 50 to 60 feet." (11)
The Engineering Design File's (EDF) places the lowest ground elevation at CPP-659 at 4912.1 mean sea level (msl) which occurs on the east side of the building. (EDF page 3). Thus, the depth of flood water may reach or exceed, depending on research utilized, 4 feet at the CPP-659 building foundation. The EDF calculates the peak flow resulting from a piping failure of Mackay dam and overtopping of the INEEL diversion dam to be a flow at the INEEL diversion dam of 28,500 cubic feet per second. The release from the dam is calculated to be 57,740 cubic feet per second. The EDF states "The peak flow is attenuated to 24,870 cubic feet per second and the peak water velocity is estimated to be 2.2 ft/s. (EDF pg. 3).
The Idaho High-Level Waste & Facilities Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement (December 1999) (HLW/EIS) flood analysis is based on the overtopping of Mackay Dam coupled with the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF).
Utilizing the same 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften, and Bureau of Reclamation studies as the EDF, the 1999 HLW/EIS-0287 (p. 4-51) states a different conclusion from the EDF that the probable maximum flood at the INTEC is a "... peak surface water elevation at INTEC of 4917 feet, with a peak flow of 66,830 cubic feet per second in the Big Lost River measured near INTEC." (12) "The average elevation at INTEC is 4,917 feet." (USGS (1998) "The peak water velocity in the INTEC vicinity was estimated at 2.7 feet per second." (HLW/EIS at 4-51). (13)
Contrary to the piping failure used by the EDF analysis, the HLW/EIS uses the scenario of an overtopping failure of Mackay dam coupled with the probable maximum flood. "The maximum flood evaluated was assumed to be caused by a probable maximum flood resulting in the overtopping and rapid failure of Mackay Dam." (HLWE/EIS P. 4-54). This determination is supported, as previously noted, in Koslow (1986 page 26). The HLW/EIS does not utilize the cubic feet per second flow rate at the INTEC stated by the EDF (2.2 cf/s). The HLW/EIS states "The Probable Maximum Flood [PMF] would quickly overtop and wash out the diversion dam so there would essentially be no effect on flows downstream of the dam. At INTEC, the PMF flow is estimated to be 66,800 cubic feet per second and the culverts are capable of passing 1500 cubic feet per second. Due to the relatively flat topography in the vicinity of INTEC, debris plugging would have little effect on the PMF flood elevation at INTEC." (HLW/EIS p. 4-54).
The Koslow and Van Haaften study recognizes that the use of a Mackay Dam piping failure scenario does not represent the upper bound event when compared to the magnitude of the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF). Koslow states (at B-22-23) "The flow from the general storm PMF scenario is of such great magnitude compared to the Mackay Dam spillway and outlet works capacities (3,250 cfs and 2,900 cfs respectively), that it will obviously overtop and cause Mackay Dam to fail." There is no rationale offered by INEEL's EDF report as to why it used the Koslow slow release 100-year "piping failure," and not the PMF scenario (also used in the HLW/EIS, especially given the inadequacy of the Mackay dam design, the spillway limitations, and the water level being essentially the same for all four of the INEEL flooding scenarios used by Koslow. (14) (Koslow, p. 14). "The spillway of Mackay Dam is not adequate to pass the PMF safely, therefore overtopping and subsequent breaching of the dam due to this PMF were analyzed." (Koslow, p. 16).
The DOE Engineering Design File and the topographic map use the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften study to arrive at the 4916 feet peak water surface elevation by using the 100-year piping failure, instead of the PMF overtopping failure of Mackay Dam. The EDF claims calculated water elevation of 4916 at CPP-659 with a flood elevation of 4 feet at the building foundation. (EDF p. 3). If the Koslow study and the HLW/EIS are correct in using the PMF, the elevation at INTEC would be 4917 feet. This would result in a flood elevation of 5 feet above the CPP-659 building foundation. If the HLW/EIS (PMF) figures of 66,830 cubic feet per second are correct for the peak flow rate at INTEC, the EDF 100-year figure (28, 500 cubic feet per second being attenuated to 24,870 cubic feet per second) is less by a factor of 169%. The flood velocity in the HLW/EIS (2.7 f/s) and EDF (2.2 f/s) differ by 23%. The difference between HLW/EIS flood elevation (5 feet at INTEC) and the EDF flood elevation (4 feet at CPP-659) is 20%. In fact, the flood flow rate can reach 3 f/s. "The Water velocity on the INEL [sic] ranges from 0.6 to 3.0 ft/s and water depth outside the banks of the Big Lost River is typically 2 to 4 feet. (Koslow at page 30).
"The PMF should be adopted as the inflow design flood (IDF) in those situations where consequences attributable to dam failure for flood conditions less than the PMF are unacceptable." (15) The potential consequences of flood disruptions at INTEC are too dangerous not to use the PMF flood elevation.
A 2001 EPA soil study of the ICDF landfill excavation immediately south of the INTEC found that the Big Lost River has not only migrated from its present channel but also has had major flood events. "The implication of the presence of these fist sized sediments is that the Big Lost River has, in its past, produced high energy environments of erosion and deposition in the area of the present landfill excavation. The river would have to have left its current channel and carved through the adjacent over-bank deposits with sufficient force to carry and then deposit cobbles greater than 3 to 4, and some up to 6 inches, in diameter. Significant water volumes and velocities are required to produce high energy deposits comprised of gravels and cobbles of this size range. These observations lead to the conclusion that location and design of the landfill in an area that has experienced fluvial flooding events of sufficient magnitude to produce these type of gravel deposits should consider the evidence of past events." (16) (Emphasis supplied). See Attachment G. This physical evidence in the immediate INTEC area at a depth of about forty-feet below grade (about the elevation of the bottom of CPP-659) verifies the PMF estimates as non-speculative.
PMF cannot be ignored as a requirement for analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act. Since analysis under RCRA must be the "functional equivalent" of a NEPA analysis, the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality is under a duty to require the analysis of the PMF. (See discussion infra, 12/9/91 Federal Facilities Agreement, 4.2(d) and 10 CFR 1022).
Considering that the HLW/EIS and the EDF both are using the USGS, 1986 Koslow, and Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) studies for their calculations which result in different conclusions, these are major discrepancies which could affect the accuracy of other calculations presented in the EDF with respect to hydrodynamic and hydrostatic forces expected to result as a consequence of the probable maximum flood. The prevention of washout at the CPP-659 could likewise be affected by the calculations. The HLW/EIS [pg 4-54] states that "... in the event of a design basis flood with sufficient magnitude and duration, it may be possible that one or more buried [high-level] 300,000 gallon waste tanks could float." Another potential effect could be the failure of calcine bin sets. Shearing of service lines and the release of radioactive liquids is another potential hazard in addition to lack of access to tanks needed to receive flood waters pumped from CPP-659.
CPP-659 Debris Processing Facility Flood Table
| Elevation/Flow Location
By Information Source |
100-Year Flood | Probable Maximum Flood |
| Flow Rate
cfs |
Elevation
msl |
Flow Rate
cfs |
Elevation
msl | |
| Koslow (1986)
w/Mackay Dam Failure INTEC |
24,870
(piping failure) |
4916 | 66,830
(Overtopping Failure) |
4917 |
| USGS (1998)
w/o Mackay Dam Failure INTEC (Lincoln Blvd.) Cross Section # 20 |
6220 |
4923 |
N/A | N/A |
| USGS (1998)
w/o Mackay Dam Failure INTEC (Monroe Blvd.) Cross Section # 21 |
6220 |
4918.1 |
N/A | N/A |
| USGS (1998)
w/o Mackay Dam Failure INTEC (NE Corner) Cross Section # 22 |
6220 |
4911.6 |
N/A | N/A |
| USGS (1996)
w/o Mackay Dam Failure INEEL SE Boundary 95% Confidence Range Above Diversion Dam |
11,600
to 3150 median at 7260 |
N/A | N/A | N/A |
| INEEL HLW/EIS (1999)
INTEC |
N/A | N/A | 66,830 | 4917 |
| Engineering Design File (1747)
w/Mackay Dam Failure INTEC CPP-659 |
24,870 |
4916 |
N/A |
N/A |
| Engineering Design File (1747)
INTEC CPP-659 Lowest Ground Level Lowest Door Level First-Floor Level |
4912.1 4914.3 4916'8" to 4917 |
N/A | N/A |
For sources see accompanying text. Cubic per second (cfs). Elevation Mean Sea Level (msl)
The Department of Energy is engaging in an administrative process of 'shopping' for studies containing results which will provide the lowest possible peak flood elevations at INTEC. In a letter dated February 12, 2001, IDEQ provided comments on the January 18, 2001 EDF. IDEQ Comment 6 states: "The higher flood elevations calculated in the [1998] USGS by Berenbrock and Kjelstrom study give rise to concerns specific to protection of human health and the environment. The IDEQ has received and reviewed these studies, which document what seem to be significantly more conservative assumptions and which would result in these higher flood elevations. The flood levels listed raise significant concerns regarding the adequacy of DOE's current flood protection devices and their ability to prevent washout during a 100-year flood. Provide a position paper summarizing the alternative assumptions used, which resulted in the higher flood elevations."
Rather than address the IDEQ concerns for higher flood elevations, the DOE response to the IDEQ 2/12/01 correspondence stated: "DOE-ID and BBWI have determined the USGS 1998 report is not to be used for RCRA permitting." The DOE erroneously claims that the 1998 USGS study gave lower flood elevations at CPP-659 and was thus less conservative than the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften report which resulted in an elevation that was 2.9 feet higher, i.e., 4916 feet [mean sea level] msl. In fact, the 1998 USGS study states the peak elevation for cross-section 20, near INTEC, is 4923 feet msl. In order to invent this purported lower elevation, DOE resorted to "interpolation methods," that were not part of the USGS study, to calculate a 4913.1 feet mean sea level water surface elevation at CPP-659. DOE claimed that the flood elevation at CPP-659 for cross section 20 is "approximately 10 feet lower than the 4923 feet msl elevation referenced by the DEQ reviewer."
Although DOE-ID claims to have communicated with Charles Berenbrock, DOE did not provide any written, certified statement from the 1998 USGS study authors themselves or any other geologists or hydrologists that indicated the cross-sections 20, 21 and 22 had incorrect elevations, required interpolation or that the manner in which DOE had interpolated the cross-sections was correctly accomplished. DOE interpolated cross-sections 21 and 22, but did not interpolate cross section 20 (4923 feet msl) with either cross-sections 21 or 22.
The WSPRO computer modeling used by the 1998 USGS study (17) showing the higher flood elevations near INTEC is based on far less volume of floodwater than the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften study. The 1998 USGS study simulated a "flow of 6,220 cubic feet per second (cfs) from cross sections 10 b through 37, the volume that would flow downstream if the diversion dam did not exist." The 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften study assumes that the 100-year flood coupled with collapse of Mackay Dam would create a Peak Flood Flow of 24,870 cfs.
The fact that the 1998 USGS study found higher peak water surface elevations at INTEC with four times less than the flow of the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften study should be a huge warning to the DOE and the State of Idaho permit writers.
Additionally, a 1996 USGS study, found that: "The upper and lower 95-percent confidence limits for the estimated 100-year [Big Lost River] peak flow were 11,600 and 3,150 cubic feet per second respectively" at the Arco Gaging Station immediately up stream of the INEEL Diversion Dam. (18) This contrasts with the median flow rate used in the USGS 1998 study of a flow rate at the INEEL Diversion Dam of 7,260 cf/s. The point is that the 1998 USGS plotting of the 100-year flood footprint at INTEC is not using the possible, upper 95-percent confidence limits documented by USGS (1996) for INEEL flooding. Therefore, the 1998 USGS study dramatically underestimates the flood impact which could occur at CPP-659/1659 and other flood vulnerable INTEC operations.
Instead, the DOE chooses to ignore the profound differences and implications of the 1998 USGS and the 1986 Koslow study. The DOE arbitrarily chooses to take the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften figures with a higher peak flood flow, in order to present a lower estimated peak flood elevation. The 1998 USGS study shows higher peak flood elevations in the immediate INTEC vicinity but these higher elevations stem from much lower flow rates than the 1986 Koslow study.
DOE rejects the 1998 USGS study because the results do not agree with the conclusion that DOE wants to draw: that the flood waters at CPP-659 will be one foot below the first floor level of CPP-659. One foot can scarcely be viewed as a margin of safety. This is especially true in view of the USGS (1996) upper 95% confidence range of 11,600 cfs.
The 1998 USGS study utilized a WSPRO computer model for water surface profile computations. (19) The computer program modeled the flood elevations utilizing numerous specific localized surface and topographical features in the near vicinity of CPP-659 at INTEC. (See Attachment B that shows the location of the NWCF (CPP-659) in relation to the INTEC and Attachment C which shows the USGS (1998) 100-year flood inside the INTEC fence literally lapping at the CPP-659 and CPP-1659). The 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften study did and could not model these specific features in the vicinity of INTEC.
The DOE is asking for a partial permit for the CPP-659/CPP-1659, but fails to use the data which is most specific for that location. The 1986 Koslow study was not made for the specific purpose of determining the elevation of the CPP-659 building and could not model the irregular typography in using the DMBRK analysis. (Koslow, pg. 29). The USGS study comes closest to a method for modeling the conditions at INTEC which are in the near vicinity of the CPP-659/1659 buildings. However, nothing specific for CPP-659 has been modelled and no actual site specific study has been performed for CPP-659 for which the partial permit is being sought.
The USGS (1998) computer program modeled the three large circular steel culverts which cross under Lincoln Boulevard immediately west of INTEC which crosses the Big Lost River and its flood plain. The program measured and modeled the intersection at Monroe and Lincoln Boulevards, the concrete head-walls, the channel from Lincoln Boulevard to the railroad bridge, the river banks that are raised with their excavated materials, the U.S. Government railroad bridge and its size and abutments and concrete pier, canal banks, a bridge supported with concrete abutments, and downstream playas, and culverts. (See USGS (1998) cross-section numbers 20 through 23).
These USGS computer modeled features existing at the INEEL that had the effect of changing flood elevations at the various cross-sections. Section 20, at the intersection of Monroe and Lincoln Boulevards where 3 culverts allowed water to pass under Lincoln Boulevard showed water surface elevation of 4923 feet. (20) This elevation is 7 feet higher than the flood elevation that DOE would like to take credit for using the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften flood elevation of 4916. Flood elevation of 4923 would also be 6 feet higher than the first floor elevation of CPP-659. The flood elevation of cross-section 21 would be 4918.1 which is still one foot higher than the first floor elevation of CPP-659. (21)
DOE is taking credit for elevations used by Koslow (4916 feet msl) despite the report's caution that the use of those elevations must be based on more study of irregular topology which is the type of study that was performed by the 1998 USGS study. The 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften study states: "Two major considerations govern the use of the results of this analysis. The first is the application of the calculated estimates of flood elevation, flow rate, etc. The second is the degree of uncertainty associated with those estimates and the assumptions on which they are based." (Koslow at p. 24). The Koslow study also cautions that "The calculated flow rates then provide the basis for a detailed review of flooding at sensitive locations along the Big Lost River channel. This review requires a high degree of experience in open channel flow in irregular topology, and was not within the scope of the current work." (1986 Koslow at p.29). (Emphasis supplied).
A conservative approach to the problem of an absence of localized data for the Koslow study, but higher elevations of the USGS study, would dictate that the localized computer modeling of the 1998 USGS study be applied to the flow volumes which are used by the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften study.
It makes no sense for IDEQ to grant a Part B Permit for the Volume 18 Debris Processing before DOE has confronted the differences and implications of the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften study, the 1998 USGS study and other studies as well as confronting the lack of flood data specific to CPP-659. DOE asks IDEQ to first permit the Debris Processing facility Volume 18 Permit and then grant an extension to conduct new floodplain studies. This DOE approach runs counter to all environmental law and regulatory precepts. DOE then wants use an internal INEEL committee to direct the studies after the permit is issued. DOE ignores the dangerous implications for public health and safety of the existing studies. (22) DOE is required to present accurate, complete, truthful information regarding the floodplain to IDEQ prior to the RCRA Part B permit issuance and commission of substantial federal resources to the project (see NEPA discussion below).
The topographic map [intec_permit_1999_200ft-el_v4, date drawn: 9/11/2001] provided to IDEQ by DOE does not satisfy the requirements of 40 CFR 270.14(b)(11)(iii) for an accurate flood plain map because the map is missing required information, contains inaccurate statements, contains a disclaimer, is not based on adequate data and does not include the entire INEEL. The topographic map was not received by IDEQ until 9/18/2001 and was not available for public review until on or about 12/18/2001.
The topographic map is not complete or final, but is subject to revision. A disclaimer on the topographic map of the INTEC area for the Volume 18 permit map provided by DOE states that the "Flood elevation indicated in this report and on this map is considered by DOE to be interim, pending issuance of a final flood plain determination under 10 CFR 1022." (Emphasis supplied). DOE has failed to consider or comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 1022. (See discussion below).
The elevation shown on the topographic map of 4916 feet at INTEC is incorrect if the HLW/EIS and Koslow PMF figure of 4917 is instead utilized. The topographic report states that the "... 4916 feet msl [mean sea level] contour interval, ... coincides with the estimated peak water surface elevation in the INTEC area, (24,879 cfs) as is discussed in 'Flood Routing Analysis for a Failure of Mackay Dam,' by Koslow and Van Haaften (1986). The EDF statement is deliberately misleading because Koslow postulated four hypothetical dam failures. The 1986 Koslow study uses 4917 feet at INTEC as the peak water surface elevation for an overtopping failure to identify the Probable Maximum Floor (PMF). The difference between the overtopping failure and the piped failure is that Koslow's piped Mackay Dam failure scenario would result in delay that occurs over a significant amount of time and therefore the flood surge is spread out possibly diminishing the impact on INEEL facilities.
The figure used in the EDF analysis of 24,879 cf/s in the INTEC area is also misleading because as previously stated "The flow from the general storm PMF scenario is of such great magnitude compared to the Mackay Dam spillway and outlet works capacities (3,250 cfs and 2,900 cfs respectively), that it will obviously overtop and cause Mackay Dam to fail." (23)
Koslow used the peak figure (PMF) of 66,830 cf/s at INTEC for an overtopping failure. (See, Koslow (1986), Table 7 at p. 26, [also see] HLW/EIS 4-51 through 4-54). The elevation of the Big Lost River stream bed stated in the topographic map is 4910 feet. Koslow places the elevation of the stream bed at 4911.
There is no assurance or information provided that the assumptions and analytical techniques utilized by the 1986 Koslow and Van Haaften for the Mackay dam failure scenario meets the requirement of use of "equivalent mapping techniques" of the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA-equivalent methods) to determine the 100-year flood elevation. The 1986 Koslow study has on its cover page a disclaimer that there is no warranty, express or implied, for the "accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information ... disclosed." DOE cannot certify information as accurate, complete and useful when a disclaimer on the document to be certified exists against that assertion.
The INEEL EDF topographic flood plain map fails to comply with 40 CFR § 270.14 to map the flow of flooding from "any source". (See, 40 CFR 264.18(b)(2)(i ) ). The DOE letter of transmittal (9/13/ 2001) for the topographic map purports that the map illustrates the 100-year flood plain which is based on the analysis by Koslow and Van Haaften (1986) in the report entitled "Flood Routing Analysis for a Failure of Mackay Dam". While the 1986 study is presented as the upward bound, the study does not include overland flow of flood waters or use the proper flood scenario from Koslow (see above discussion). The flooding map does not take into account the additional flow which would occur from overland sources. ( IDEQ/INEEL Quarterly Meeting June 8, 2000 Neil C. Hutten- "Overland flow study for INTEC is needed.")
The EDF study assumes considerable attenuation/absorption which may not be applicable to the "typical" INEEL flooding during times of frozen ground, snow pack melt, and excessive precipitation. reported no loss of flow resulting from infiltration during the early part of the 1965 flood of the Big Lost River. At that time infiltration was blocked by frozen ground and (or) ice. DOE statements are admissions that the specific information required to be provided to show compliance with 40 CFR part 264 standards for a Part B Application is not currently available. The permit should be denied because the required information is not available. "DOE is not selecting either the USGS or the BOR studies as determinative." Additional studies are recommended. (12/22/2000 letter of Ronald Guymon to IDEQ Katherine Kelly). DOE is proposing an extension for making a final floodplain determination to year 2002. Guymon states: "The extent of the 100-year floodplain at INTEC due to overland flow, as opposed to riverine sources described above, is not currently known. A study that assesses 100-year storm runoff from the entire watershed area that drains toward INTEC, including runoff from facility drainage areas, must be undertaken." Additionally, the 25-year, 24-hour storm evaluation has not been updated to reflect current hydrologic conditions at the site. Detailed topographic and hydrologic analyses necessary to make these determinations have not been performed. (See, CCN 00-010826- July 6, 2000 INEEL letter and enclosure to R.E. Bullock-Floodplain Requirements for Volume 18 of the RCRA Part B Permit Application for the INEEL - Compliance schedule).
The requirement to provide a topographic map applies to the entire INEEL, not just the INTEC. 40 CFR 270.14(b)(19) requires "A topographic map showing a distance of 1000 feet around the facility ..." This requirement has not been met. No topographic map for the INEEL has been furnished.
The topographic map does not contain required information regarding either the aquifer or the groundwater and its direction of flow and rate. 40 CFR 270.14(c)(3) requires "On the topographic map under Paragraph (b)(19) of this section ... to the extent possible, the information required in paragraph (c)(2) of this section." Section (c)(2) requires "Identification of the uppermost aquifer and aquifers hydraulically interconnected beneath the facility property, including groundwater flow direction and rate, and the basis for such identification, i.e., the information obtained from hydrogeologic investigations of the area."
A groundwater monitoring program must be set forth. (40 CFR 270.14(c)(5).
Groundwater which does not have the presence of hazardous constituents must comply with requirements of 40 CFR 270.14(c)(6). Groundwater which has the presence of hazardous constituents must comply with requirements of 40 CFR §§ 270.14(c)(7) and (8). The Volume 18 Part B Permit Application does not specify any compliance with those requirements. This issue is especially egregious given that major contaminate plumes exist under the INTEC. (24) The existing soil and ground water contamination from INTEC past/present operations pose an extreme hazard from flooding which will drive these pollutants into the aquifer. Any additional operations contemplated by the subject permit will only add to this existing hazard and therefore must be stopped.
The topographic map does not provide details for the plume of contamination. 40 CFR 270.14(c)(4) requires "A description of any plume of contamination that has entered the ground water from a regulated unit at the time that the application was submitted that: (I ) Delineates the extent of the plume on the topographic map required under (b)(19) of this section; (ii) identifies the concentration of each appendix IX, of part 264 of this chapter, constituent throughout the plume or identifies the maximum concentrations of each appendix IX constituent in the plume." (See, Final Record of Decision, INTEC, October 1999, for ground water contaminate zones. (DOE/ID-10660) ).
Because the flood information is misleading, not complete and in conflict, neither IDEQ nor the public has any assurance that the topographic map is true, accurate and complete, which is required for a RCRA certification under 40 CFR 270.11(d) and 270.30 (k). (See discussion above).
Certifications accompanying the topographic map were made under penalty of law by W. W. Gay, General Manager Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC, (8/21/01) and B. A. Cook, Manager, Idaho Falls Operations Office, Idaho (9/11/01). The certifications have no validity because (1) the facts relied upon are incomplete, false, or misconstrue the facts, (2) as discussed above, the required information for a topographic map is missing. The topographic map Legend has a disclaimer that the map is merely an "interim" document, "pending issuance of a final floodplain determination under 10 CFR 1022." Thus, the map cannot be complete where it is interim and subject to revision. The topographic map relies on the 1986 Koslow study, which also has a disclaimer on the cover page and the study also has no certification. Petitioner contends moreover that Gay, and Cook cannot legally make the Regulatory Certification that the topographic map is "true, accurate and complete" because of the missing information regarding the underground water and the contamination plume along with the disclaimers and the fact that a topographic map is required for the entire INEEL facility.
Also, a Regulatory Certification signed (1/18/01) by B. A. Cook and P. H. Divjak,
Vice President, Operations Bechtel BWXT Idaho, LLC, attempts to include in the certification "recommended language for insertion to the existing Volume 18 Part B permit application as Section B-3b." The inclusion of Section B-3b for Regulatory Certification with the Engineering Design File is improper because the document itself is not properly a part of the Engineering Design File, is without any date, review and/or approval signatures and lacks authorship as well as certification. Moreover, the B-3b document is precluded by prior certified representations of the DOE-ID from being utilized. The B-3b document submitted for RCRA permitting purposes, cites the 1998 USGS study. The Attachment B Certification for the May 18, 2001 Transmittal of Response to Comments on Floodplain Information response for comment 6 states that "DOE-ID and BBWI have determined the USGS 1998 report is not to be used for RCRA permitting." (Emphasis supplied.) The Certification for the Transmittal of Response to Comments on Floodplain Information and the Certification for Floodplain Determination and Prevention of Washout (signed 1/18/01) are therefore in conflict with respect to their assertions. Even though the DOE claims that it will not use the 1998 USGS study, document B-3b attempts to take credit for the lower flow rate of 7,260 cubic feet in the 1998 USGS study without referencing the higher flood elevations (up to 4923 ft. msl) at INTEC. (See discussion above).
IDEQ should continue the stay on the issuance of the permit and construction activities until the floodplain/wetlands requirements of 10 CFR 1022 and NEPA have been complied with by DOE and approved by IDEQ.
10 CFR 1022 et seq requires that Federal agencies implement the floodplain/wetlands requirements through existing procedures such as those established to implement the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. (10 CFR 1022.1). The floodplain/wetlands requirements are raised by the text of the topographic map and have not been considered or complied with by DOE prior to the floodplain issue being raised.
IDEQ cannot ignore the notice or early public review requirements of 10 CFR 1022 or NEPA. On 12/9/91 the State of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (now IDEQ), entered into a Federal Facility Agreement. Under the terms of the Federal Facilities Agreement/Consent Order, IDEQ is charged with assuring compliance with all state and federal laws for hazardous waste management. (12/9/91 Federal Facilities Agreement, 4.2(d) ).
The current RCRA Part B Application analysis is inadequate to constitute the functional equivalency of the required NEPA analysis. The National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) requirements have not been satisfied. DOE is required, to the extent possible, to accommodate the requirements of Executive Orders 11988 and 11990 through applicable DOE NEPA procedures. 10 CFR 1022.2(2)(b). Volume 18 does not reference, or meet the 10 CFR 1022 NEPA requirements. DOE must perform an environmental impact statement under the requirements of 10 CFR 1022 et seq. sufficient to meet the requirements of NEPA. (25) DOE's environmental impact statement must include: environmental impacts, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided, alternatives, relationship of short term use and enhancement of long term productivity of the wetlands, and any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.
IDEQ has unreasonably and arbitrarily limited this appeal to a review of floodplain information only with respect to the Debris Processing Facility. The public is entitled to participate in all the environmental considerations of recently submitted information with respect to INEEL before the DOE proceeds with action. Petitioner argued at the July 21, 2000 IDEQ public hearing that there was no consideration of environmental effects and alternatives of the proposed course of action within the documents. IDEQ incorrectly responded that "This is beyond the scope of the permit review process..." (See, October 5, 2001 IDEQ Response to Comments and Approval of a Permit on the INEEL, EPA ID No. ID4890008952, p. 3).
The 1995 DOE/EIS analysis for local runoff and floodplains (p. 4.8-3) is less than one page, and is wholly deficient because it does not examine or describe what the environmental effects of inundation of INEEL facilities would be from various flood scenarios. NEPA requires not just an analysis of CPP-659, but also an analysis of the surrounding buildings and contaminated grounds and groundwater which are subject to the flooding.
DOE has failed to provide procedures and opportunity for early public review of proposed floodplain/wetland plans and actions, such as the debris processing facility. (10 CFR 1022.2(a) ). Petitioner has argued elsewhere in this proceeding that the RCRA expanded public participation rule has not been observed by DOE or IDEQ. IDEQ's position is that the rule was not adopted by IDEQ until 1997 so as to preclude application to the Volume 18 Part B Permit Application. There are no minutes of the public pre-application meeting minutes because the meeting was not held. (See, 40 CFR 270.14(b)(22) and 40 CFR 124.31(c ) ).
The public notice and review requirements of 10 CFR 1022 for floodplains/wetlands have, however, been in effect for DOE since 1977. DOE has failed to meet its public notification duties for this floodplain action and provide opportunity for any public review of any plans or proposals for this action in the floodplain. (10 CFR 1022.3(3). (See, 10 CFR 1022.4(q) requirement for Federal Register notice for proposed floodplain requirements). The DOE had and continues to have a duty under 10 CFR 1022, since 1996 or earlier, to give public notice and provide the public early opportunity to review the proposed action for debris processing and any other plans to be carried out within the floodplain. What has instead occurred in the Volume 18 proceeding is that DOE, with IDEQ's tacet approval, has shut the public out of the floodplain procedural process which would enable the public to have a more comprehensive look at the floodplain in relation to the numerous proposals for actions. DOE is attempting to bypass its own internal agency rules. This violates the public's right to be involved in the decision making process.
IDEQ should continue to stay Part B permit approval and construction until DOE has complied with these requirements for full public notification and review provided under the floodplain requirements of 10 CFR 1022.3(3).
The May 29, 2000 IDEQ notice for Docket No. 10HW-0003 debris processing did not provide a whisper of notice to the public that the permit was to involve an action for treatment units within the floodplain. (Likewise, the notice of the INEEL Liquid Waste Management System, incorporating the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator, the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal facility, and the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator, failed to provide notice to the public of intended floodplain activities.)
Consideration of environmental consequences and alternatives or for remediation to the proposed action which are required under 10 CFR 1022 have not been presented for analysis for the Volume 18 debris processing. Possible remediation of the flooding consequences for CPP-659/1659 may be the construction of a barrier around the building to floodproof the building. Construction of a diversion dam and channels to withstand the collapse of Mackay dam may be another possible way to floodproof INTEC. The extended duration of the flood in excess of 60 hours ( 5 days) would require additional subsurface barriers to prevent sub-surface flows.
Quarterly RCRA meetings are secret IDEQ/DOE meetings held in violation of state and federal open meeting laws. The RCRA meetings are used to preclude the public from obtaining information regarding issues which IDEQ and DOE jointly discuss and decisions made at the meetings regarding those issues. An IDEQ/INEEL Quarterly Meeting June 8, 2000 Neil C. Hutten document, only recently furnished to the public as a result of this appeal, states that DOE is developing a draft NEPA Notice of Floodplain Involvement. A draft notice of floodplain involvement was/is required before the intended issuance of the Volume 18 Part B Permit and at an early stage of the development of the permit to include the public. No notice was ever presented in the Federal Register by DOE describing this proposed debris processing action in the floodplain. (See 10 CFR 1022.4(q)) notice requirements for proposed floodplain actions). If IDEQ steams ahead with permit approval, the public will be presented with a DOE fait accompli in the floodplain with no meaningful consideration given by DOE (or IDEQ) to environmental protection, procedurally required under NEPA, and alternatives or modifications to "...minimize potential harm to or within the floodplain and to restore and preserve floodplain values." (10 CFR 1022.5(b))
Because the HLW/EIS has not been finalized and no Record of Decision exists, DOE is under a current duty, to the extent possible, to apply the requirements of 10 CFR 1022 to this debris processing action and other proposed actions in the floodplain/wetlands. (10 CFR 1022.5(b)). The current 1999 draft HLW/EIS does not have any listing in the index for debris processing. No alternatives to the proposed action were presented.
The debris processing facility action is a critical action as defined by 1022.4 ( c) involving highly volatile, toxic or water reactive materials in the floodplain. The critical action floodplain is defined as the 500-year (0.2 percent) floodplain. No 500-year flood analysis has been performed for the Debris Processing facility or for the other facilities housed within or near to CPP-659/1659, such as the Tank Farm, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator and the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator.
No adequate NEPA or 10 CFR 1022 environmental analysis exists for floodplain issues which would link the Debris Processing Facility to the hazards associated with floodplain issues which could cause failure at other facilities at INTEC including, but not limited to, facilities such as the tank farm facility (floating of 300,000 gallon tanks) and the New Waste Calciner Facility calcine bin sets. SPERT-III and SPERT-IV overland flow analyses are not complete (in internal review) and available for public review (IDEQ/INEEL Quarterly Meeting June 8, 2000- Neil C. Hutten).
The public is entitled to consider floodplain issues related to the Debris Processing facility in relation to the above or other facilities, such as the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal facility, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator and the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator. The new INTEC waste percolation ponds and the ICDF landfill in the flood zone may also receive some of the Debris Process facility effluent.
Service water from the Debris Processing facility which will be processed by the Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE) and the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal Facility (LET&D) waste will enter into the [INTEC] percolation ponds. The contamination will be spread further into the soil column and aquifer by flooding which will occur at INTEC. INTEC continues to discharge about two million gallons a day of liquid effluents per day to the existing contaminated soil column under the existing percolation ponds These ongoing discharges violate Doe Order 5400.5 paragraph 3.c(2).
INEEL has not complied with the provisions of DOE Order 5400.5 since it was issued in 1993. In addition, INEEL does not have a defensible technical basis for a new percolation pond, which could create a new contaminated soil column. In designing the new percolation ponds pond, the hazards and the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5, which prohibit the creation of new soil columns were not rigorously analyzed. There is potential for service water to contaminate a soil column. "In another example, the risks associated with potential and inadvertent discharges of radioactively-contaminated water to the INTEC percolation pond have not been fully analyzed." (26) [See Attachment F].
Additionally, RCRA's mandate of "cradle to grave" management of hazardous waste dictates that the solid waste discharged from the Debris Processing and HEPA Leaching operation be disposed in a RCRA compliant disposal facility. The designated INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) slated to intern this waste is not RCRA compliant because the ICDF, being contiguous with INTEC, is also in the Big Lost River floodplain. The CERCLA facility violates DOE Order 5400.5 because it is being built in the floodplain over the aquifer.
DOE is using the CERCLA process to circumvent RCRA Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR). (27)
Numerous other unresolved floodplain issues exist at the INEEL with severe environmental consequences when viewed as a totality along with the planned debris processing facility. "Nobel (1980) used a two dimensional model, with cells 530 feet on a side, to simulate a peak flow in the area from the western INEEL boundary to the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC). He estimated that the depth of water at the RWMC resulting from the failure of Mackay Dam would be 6 feet." " Rathburn (1989, 1991), estimated that the depth of water at the RWMC, resulting from a paleoflood of 2 to 4 million cubic feet/sec in the Big Lost River in Box Canyon and overflow areas, was 50 to 60 feet." (28) The EPA recently expressed concerns that there is enough plutonium in the ground at Pit 9 at RWMC that a flood event could cause a criticality reaction, a release of high level radiation. (29) A RWMC RCRA floodplain issue is that "Overland flow hydrology needs to be updated to include new topograpy, new buildings, and hydrology changes since 1993. (See INEEL 7/6/00 letter to R.E. Bullock IDEQ).
IDEQ knows that DOE has plans for the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator (HLLWE) and that certain tanks associated with the Debris Processing facility have no RCRA permits. (See discussion above regarding tanks VES-NCC-122 and VES-NCC-119). IDEQ still refuses to require the DOE to hold the preapplication meeting required by the RCRA Expanded participation Rule or involve the public at the early stages under the Floodplain/Wetlands Review requirements of 10 CFR 1022. Petitioner can only wonder how long IDEQ will continue to refuse to protect the public its procedural rights with respect to the IDEQ hazardous waste management program. IDEQ must begin to apply the full requirements of federal environmental law as well as inclusion of the public at the earliest stages of planning for actions at INEEL.
No legal provision under the RCRA statutory scheme exists for granting a three-year extension to the Department of Energy after the effective date of the issuance of a permit for Volume 18. The floodplain information, assessments and complete topographic map are mandatorily required by 40 CFR 270.14 et seq., the NEPA and 10 CFR 1022 prior to issuance of the permit and the commitment of Federal resources. The Department of Energy seeks a three year extension to submit the above floodplain assessments for riverine and overland flow based on DOE's reading of 40 CFR § 270.14(b)(11)(v). DOE misreads the regulation which applies to an "existing facility." Although the Debris Processing facility will be housed in the existing CPP-659 building, the debris processing facility is not an existing operating facility, but is a modification of a facility involving a new and different process for which a RCRA Part B permit is required.
The debris processing facility and other facilities with a pending Part B application, e.g., the evaporators (the PEWE and the HLLWE), lie within the floodplain and full assessment under 10 CFR 1022 et seq. must also be provided prior to these project permit approvals. IDEQ should not grant DOE approval of the Part B permit prior to DOE furnishing the necessary floodplain information as provided by state and federal law. IDEQ should not allow DOE to rely on studies with disclaimers, to provide false, inaccurate, incomplete, conflicting and unsubstantiated data and/or fail to provide the necessary floodplain information and skirt the requirements for protection against washout. DOE is required to provide the floodplain assessments in a timely fashion to complete the Part B Application requirements previous to permit issuance.
In the event the 100-year flood were to occur during the unpermitted period of operation of the debris processing facility, DOE has no provisions for safe removal of the hazardous wastes which would be contained in CPP-659. DOE has not met the necessary "in lieu of" requirements for safe removal of wastes to a RCRA compliant facility which would allow DOE to avoid the application of provisions 40 CFR 270.14(b)(11)(iv)(A) and (B).
The Debris Processing facility should be required to meet current standards for construction and location for protection of public health and safety.
The INEEL EDF study repeatedly states "construction of the NWCF follows many of the methods described in the [American Concrete Institute] ACI standards to assure a watertight structure." (EDF-1747 page 11). There is no specification as to which aspects of the standards conform and which do not! Therefore the whole reference is in question. Moreover, the EDF file calculates the retaining wall's capacity to withstand a flood assuming retaining wall (building perimeter foundation) reinforcing steel (#4 bar spaced on 8 inch centers) (EDF-1747 page 9) without any documentation that was actually used.
This retaining wall capacity data was totally assumed without other basis or documentation. The EDF states (EDF-1747 pg. 8): "Another important consideration is the ability of the retaining walls to withstand lateral earth pressure. In the section on hydrodynamic analysis, the at-rest lateral earth pressure of saturated soil was computed and shown to be 2 times larger than the pressure of dry soil. This particular flood hazard affects all below-grade retaining walls that support backfill. The structural design of the second and third levels of CPP-659 is complex, and the concrete retaining walls have a variable height, width, and thickness. Surcharge loads are present in addition to lateral earth pressure. Furthermore, the strength of reinforced concrete depends on the exact size, number, and placement of the steel bars. Therefore, a thorough assessment of the effect of soil saturation on the stress in retaining walls is complex structural analysis that is beyond the scope of this study." (Emphasis supplied).
Additionally, interior wall spacing is assumed. "To examine the loading on the weakest section of retaining wall, assume that the length of the beam is equal to 8 feet - the maximum spacing between supports ..." (EDF pg. 8 & 9).
No satisfactory engineering analysis or structural or other engineering studies have been provided by DOE for the combined overland flow and the riverine flow. The January 18, 2001 Response does not provide an analysis for the combined overland and riverine floodplain effects. The Engineering Design File included with the 1/18/01 Response is based only on "hydrodynamic and structural analyses of flood hazards at CPP-659 during a peak flow in the Big Lost River." (EDF-1747). The analyses are also not based on the 100-year flood and overtopping of Mackay Dam.
III. Numerous structural issues related to flooding appear from the Engineering Design File (EDF) for the CPP-659 Flood Hazard Analysis.
The EDF states "The structural features of the concrete foundation at CPP-659 were examined during a field investigation." (EDF, p, 7). The field investigation which was the basis for many of the statements contained in the EDF is not provided as part of DOE documentation furnished to IDEQ or the public. Without the field investigation documents the public and IDEQ are unable to review numerous assumptions or assertions based on the field investigation and/or the relationship to RCRA requirements.
There is no apparent reference to when the field investigation was performed or who performed the field investigation and no certification of the investigation is presented. (EDF, p. 7). Is the field investigation relying upon the quarter-century-old Soil and Foundation Investigation, Proposed New Calcining Facility, Prepared for the Energy Research and Development Administration, Flour Contract No. 453504, Dames and Moore, 1976, listed in the EDF reference section? If this is the field study relied upon, how currently competent are the assertions in the EDF regarding the conditions of the retaining walls, the condition of the joints fitted with carbon steel, cracking and seepage? What is the current status of the condition of the CPP-659 building? What are the requirements with respect to current construction codes which should be in place for the Debris Processing facility as a new facility?
Many of the design practices of the American Concrete Institute, ACI Manual of Concrete Practice are asserted to have been applied to the construction of CPP-659. No mention is made of the design practices which may not have been applied during the construction of CPP-659. Since the Part B application is for a new facility, current construction codes should be complied with.
No analysis is performed as to what seepage rates or volumes might exist under the maximum postulated overland and riverine flood conditions. Water seepage was observed at CPP-659, but no comprehensive details are provided as to the volume, conditions or the sources or location of seepage which existed at the time of the observance. Additionally, no statements are offered as to the time of year these leaks were observed. Was it during the dry months of August or wet times of March? Was the seepage observed more than 25 years ago as part of the 1976 Dames and Moore field investigation or is this an observation from a current field investigation?
Water infiltration which could occur from the utility piping is not quantitatively analyzed and the public cannot determine what specific flood devices would be used to route the water to the hot sump tank or the adequacy of the tank to accommodate flood water. Additionally, the facility sumps and pumps capacity data is not provided to document the surge capacity during a 100-year flood scenario. Also, the claims of sump pumps to handle minor inflow are questionable because these pumps were not sized for floods, but rather just for minor drip leaks. What is the life expectancy of carbon steel joints, built in 1977? (EDF, P. 7) These are not stainless steel and rust may be a factor 25 years after construction of CPP-659. (30)
The EDF does not specifically or adequately describe the flood protection devices for which it asserts preclusion from washout of hazardous wastes from the building. The EDF attempts to take claim for "flood protection devices" for pipe or utility penetrations into the walls of CPP-659. (EDF, pp. 1, 2, 3). The EDF does not state the specific flood protection devices nor relate those devices to the types of specific failures which may occur. Nor is there any listing or specific description of flood control devices to reduce the likelihood of erosion and sediment transport at CPP-659.
The adequacy of the VES-NCC-122, the non-fluoride hot sump tank, and a 600 gallon portable tank during peak flood conditions to temporarily hold the volume of water which might enter CPP-659 is not discussed. The accessible/usable volume for VES-NCC-122 is not stated. Tanks which would be utilized to hold water entering from the utility tunnel are not described for their volume. Pumps which would be necessary to transport flood water to other locations are either non-existent or not described. Is there any relation to the 300,000 gallon tanks which can be floated and, due to severed service lines, not available to receive flood water pumped from CPP-659?
VES-NCC-122 and VES-NCC-119 are also linked to the operation of the HLLWE (High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator) operations. VES-NCC-122 and VES-NCC-119 have no RCRA permits and are not included in the Volume 18 application, but "... will be permitted with the HLLWE." (8/28/1998 Volume 18 NOD pp. 14-15, D-ib Container Storage Area Drainage). DOE should not be granted approval of the permit application by IDEQ prior to furnishing the necessary floodplain information as provided for by state and federal law.
There has been no preapplication meeting provided for the public for the HLLWE permit, in violation of the RCRA Expanded Public Participation Rule and 10 CFR 1022.3(e), to provide such a hearing and public review of these proposals for plans and actions in the floodplain. The HLLWE and VES-NCC-122 and VES-NCC-119 operate illegally without any RCRA permit.
The EDF provides no information regarding the ability to carry out sampling activities for water entering the utility tunnel prior to sending the water to the hot sump tank. A 600-gallon tank would hold the water before sampling, but it is not clear if the holding tank would be adequate for the amount of seepage or flooding entering CPP-659. No information is provided as to how or whether the sampling can even be accomplished under maximum flood conditions. How long will it take to sample the water under maximum flood conditions? Who will perform the duties? Will the flood and/or radiation make access impossible, and to what areas? What are the effects of inability to sample the water and transfer to the hot sump tank without sampling? What is the reliability of grid power and emergency backup generators during a flood if the generators get flooded out?
The asserted protection from seepage from the use of silicon sealant is not adequately described. The locations where silicon sealant will be applied and the basis for ability of the sealant to perform under the extremes of postulated flood conditions is not provided. The amount of seepage into CPP-659 under flood conditions has not been calculated. Additionally, there is no documentation that silicone sealant applied on the inside of the wall or elsewhere, meets current ACI standards. (CCN 23977-July 23, 2001 J. E. Rugg (INEEL) letter to R. E. Bullock (IDEQ).
Water from the tank farm waste pipe would be waste entering the CPP-659 from the tank farm facility which does not have a RCRA permit. In the 8/25/1998 List of Deficiencies (NOD, p.5, C-1b Waste in Tank Systems), it is stated that "... the tank farm is a non-permittable unit." The Response states that the "cease use" date for the tank farm will be moved from 2001 to 2003. The Response further states that a compliance schedule cannot be stated until the Record of Decision for the High Level Waste and Facility Disposition Environmental Impact Statement is issued late 1999. (The ROD for the HLW/EIS has not issued with a development of the preferred option.) RCRA does not permit release of RCRA waste to non-RCRA facilities. The use of the tank farm to receive the release of chemical solutions from the Debris Processing facility is not legal under RCRA.
The tank farm pipe penetrates the inner cell structure. There is no specificity as to what flood protection devices are designed to route water to a sump in the valve cubicle. If one or more 300,000 gallon tanks are floated, as the HLW/EIS states as a possible effect of the 100-year flood, what is the potential impact of such an event on the Debris Processing facility?
There is no analysis provided regarding the current structural integrity of the concrete walls which are below grade. Whether the concrete walls, which are below grade, would allow the entry of flood waters to the CPP-659 from lateral stress, is not determined. No thorough assessment has been made on the effect of soil saturation on the stress to the retaining walls which are above or below grade. The structural design of the actual concrete retaining walls with respect to their height, width and thickness and placement of steel bars to withstand lateral earth pressure under saturated conditions has not been analyzed. As discussed above, only an analysis based on assumed and unsubstantiated structural components is offered. There is no analysis of voids in the concrete. There is no statement as to whether the CPP-659 was poured as a contiguous concrete structure or whether there are seams which may allow entry of flood water at various locations. All concrete structures are designed to allow for expansion/contraction. Joints fitted with carbon steel were apparently not examined for their current integrity.
Nor do the preventative measures cited by the EDF meet ACI requirements to prevent flooding ingress. For, example, the carbon steel may not meet current joint seal requirements and/or the life expectancy of the steel may have been exceeded given the CPP-659 building was constructed in 1977. This steel issue also can apply to the hatches below, depending on the elevation of the tunnel and the other penetrations. The considerable hydrostatic pressure (water head) is a crucial issue in barriers/sealants. In other words, the deeper below the surface, the larger the head, giving less effective downstream (interior) sealants' protection. The water pressure can cause separation from the substrata to which the sealant is attached, particularly if the concrete is old, wet or crumbly.
Concrete hatches in the maintenance area are a possible pathway for entry of floodwater into CPP-659. While the EDF document (p. 8) asserts that the elevation of the concrete hatches is one foot above the hypothetical one-year flood, the figures used in the HLW/EIS (p. 4-51) would indicate that the one-foot margin of safety does not exist because the flood level at INTEC is 5 or more feet (4917 to 4923 peak elevation) rather than the 4 feet (4916 peak elevation) which the EDF assumes. The analysis also does not take into account the combination with overland flow and/or wind generated surging or waves.
An entire listing of all the doorways and openings for water to enter the CPP-659/1659 has not been provided by the EDF. The study refers to "doorways and other openings". (P. 12). If the HLW/EIS flood water elevation figure of 4917 is utilized, the doorway entry at the north side of CPP-659 would have only a .7 foot clearance, instead of a 1.7 foot clearance claimed by the EDF. There is a large 18 foot 4 inch truck bay door opening on the first floor ground level northwest corner of the building that has an elevations between 4916' 6-1/2" to 4917'-0" (31) (See Attachment H.)
"Typically, waste may be brought into CPP-1659 through one of two doors, a telescoping door (14 x 20 ft.) on the waste end of room 418 and a man door on the south end of CPP-1659. Typically, waste may be brought into CPP-659 through one of two entrances: the vehicle entry way (417) or the unloading dock on the north side of the building into room 428 (see exhibit D-1). Waste is transferred to lower-level areas through hatches in room 418 or 428." (32)
The waste is processed in flood vulnerable below grade levels and the large truck bay door in CPP-659 and the "telescoping" truck doors in CPP-1659 add significantly to the building's flood-water vulnerability. Moreover, if the flood-waters enter the CPP-659, the waste hatches described above will provide a direct route to the below-level waste processing areas.
No analysis of cracking which may exist in the third floor concrete foundation was made by the EDF. The EDF has not considered whether RCRA requirements may exist for double containment liners. Although concrete does not qualify for RCRA containment due to its porosity, DOE still incorrectly attempts to take credit for concrete foundation/cell walls even though there is no stainless steel liner of sufficient height to contain the entire unit's volume required by RCRA for double containment.
The EDF analysis of reduction of erosive forces to the CPP-659 by the presence of unspecified flood control devices is not credible. The EDF has provided no factual basis whatsoever for taking credit for any amount of slowing and diversion to control erosions at CPP-659. No credit can be taken for erosion reduction where there has been no analysis performed of the ability of unspecified flood control devices to divert water to unspecified storage basins and unspecified roads and unspecified buildings. A IDEQ/INEEL Quarterly Meeting June 8, 2000 Neil C. Hutten document states that "Overland flow hydrology needs to be updated to include new topography, new buildings, and hydrology changes since 1993." Thus, the analysis of the EDF is unreliable with respect to credit taken for erosion control. Furthermore the peak flow volumes, peak flow rates and peak flood water elevation are in dispute. Erosive forces may not be fully considered for debris size, e.g., cobblestones moving at high velocity. (33)
The twenty-five year floodplain analyses which have been performed for INEEL facilities that have containers, tanks and waste piles "need to be evaluated to determine ... whether they need to be updated for current conditions." ( IDEQ/INEEL Quarterly Meeting June 8, 2000 Neil C. Hutten). The Debris Processing tanks and containers may not have been assessed from the perspective of the 100 year flood.
No information has been provided in relation to flooding as to whether fires, explosions or sudden releases of hazardous wastes or hazardous constituents or incompatible chemical reactions could occur or result from the 100-year flood. 40 CFR § 270.14(c)(7) (contingency plan) and 40 CFR § 270.14(c)(8) (procedures structures or equipment) have not been addressed by the draft permit in relation to floodplain information. A contingency plan has not been developed which includes the additional hazards and actions facility personnel must take in response to the 100-year flooding. (See, 40 CFR §§ 264.50 through 264.56, 264.52(b), 264.52(d)and (e), 264.55, 264.56(c), 264.56(d), 264.56(j), 264.16(a)(1)and 270.14(b)(7) which sections address a contingency plan, emergency coordinators, notification procedures, hazard assessment, emergency equipment, and training programs.
The closure plan does not take into account the 100-year flood effect on closure cost estimate for the facility. 40 CFR §§ 270.14(b)(15). The closure plan does not address additional problems of decommissioning and decontamination which may result from the 100-year flood. (40 CFR §§264.110 through 264.120, 270.14(b)(13).
Petitioner contends that IDEQ improperly reached a final decision to approve the Part B Permit prior to provision of a reopened public comment period in this matter. IDEQ has again denied the public a full opportunity for comment and response to those comments by IDEQ prior to a decision to issue the permit. In submitting this brief, Petitioner does not waive any challenges which he has raised to the IDEQ Director's jurisdiction to hear this matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Floodplain information submitted to IDEQ by DOE is not in compliance with the requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 40 CFR 264.18(b), 40 CFR §270.14 et seq., the Floodplain/Wetlands environmental review requirements of 10 CFR 1022 et seq., and/or the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The Idaho Department of Environmental Quality should continue a stay upon approval and issuance of the Volume 18 Part B Permit and stay further construction related to the Debris Processing facility in INTEC CPP-659/1659 building until such time that DOE complies with the above requirements of state and federal environmental law for the Debris Processing facility and other associated facilities which lie within the floodplain/wetlands at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory.
Petitioner would like to acknowledge technical contribution and review by Chuck Broscious at the Environmental Defense Institute.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________ Date: _____________
David B. McCoy
Attachments
Attachment A.
Koslow (1986) Figure 6 Inundation map for the 100-year flood piping failure, that shows the flood encompassing the entire CPP, page 22.
Attachment B:
INEEL High-level Waste EIS pg 1-8, DOE/EIS-02870, photo of INTEC facilities.
Attachment C:
Final Record of Decision, Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, Operable Unit 3-13, October 1999, DOE/ID-10660, page 5-2. Figure 5-1: 100-year floodplain at INTEC (USGS 1998).
Attachment D:
INEEL High-Level Waste EIS page 1-8, view of the location of the Debris Processing in the New Waste Calciner Facility, that shows NWCF due east of the main entrance to the INTEC and within the USGS (1998) foodplain footprint, DOE/EIS-0287D.
Attachment E:
INEEL High-Level Waste EIS (DOE/0287D), page 5-207, Table 5.3-23 Summary of facility that shows the CPP-659 New Waste Calciner Facility bounding operations accident as "Flood-induced failure."
Attachment F:
Focused Safety Management Evaluation of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, January 2001, Office of Independent Environment, Safety, and Health Oversight Environment, Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Energy, pages 25, 26, and 50.
Attachment G:
Roland, John, PG, Hasemeier, Robert, PE, Gannet Fleming Inc., Memorandum to Wayne Pierre, EPA, Site Visit: INEEL ICDF construction, October 25, 2001.
Attachment H:
1st. Level Floor and [Foundation] FDN Plan Decontamination Area New Waste Calcine Facility, Drawing No. 1495-CPP-659-C-314, Fluor Construction, Los Angles, CA for U.S. Energy [Research and Development] R&D Administration (predecessor to Department of Energy), 1977. Drawing is also numbered 132465.
Attachment I:
Newspaper clippings from the Mackay Miner, June 22, 1933, June 29, 1933, July 6, 1933, July 27, 1933. Photo of dynamited headgate of Mackay Dam.
Attachment C
January 16, 2002
Chuck Broscious
Executive Director
Environmental Defense Institute, Inc
P. O. Box 220
Troy, Idaho 83871-0220
V 208-835-6152
F 208-835-5407
Sent via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to:
Administrative Hearing Coordinator
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706
and
Office of Counsel
U. S. Department of Energy
785 DOE Place
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Before the Director of the
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
IN THE MATTER OF THE )
HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT ) ORDER GRANTING LIMITED
AND STORAGE PARTIAL ) REVIEW OF PERMIT
) Docket No 10HW-0109
PERMIT FOR UNITS A INEEL )
BLDGS. CPP 659/1659 ) IDAPA 58.05.013 [40 CFR SS 124.19]
)DAVID McCOY, )
PETITIONER ) ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE
) INSTITUTE, INC.'S AMICUS CURIE BRIEF
Introduction
This brief is submitted by the Environmental Defense Institute, Inc., (EDI) a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting responsible public policy concerning Idaho's human and natural environment and protecting the health and welfare of Idaho's citizens and natural resources. The majority of EDI's members are Idaho residents, many of whom reside within the fifty mile impact zone of the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL).
At issue is the Department of Energy (DOE) hazardous waste storage and treatment units identified in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B permit application for Debris/HEPA Filter Leachate Processing at the INEEL Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) buildings CPP-659/1659. Notice of Order is Docket No 10HW-0109, signed 12/18/01 by Robert Bullock, Hazardous Waste Permit Coordinator, Idaho Department of Environmental Quality.
EDI's objective (via this Brief) is to appraise the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (IDEQ) of the gravity of this specific permit, and the environmental destruction created by the DOE's mis-management of radioactive and hazardous chemical materials at this INEEL site.
In view of IDEQ's procedural errors, EDI presents additional flood-related information directly related to the subject permit operation's waste inflo/outflow that are required by RCRA. (40 CFR 270.14 through 270.29) It is imperative that the IDEQ take corrective action by denying or fundamentally requiring DOE to modify the subject Debris/HEPA Leaching Processing hazardous waste permit. Specifically, EDI requests that IDEQ block the siting of radioactive and hazardous waste storage, treatment and disposal facilities in areas known to be susceptible to flooding from the Big Lost River and/or catastrophic failure of Mackay Dam, in addition to requiring DOE to evaluate alternative and less pollutant prone alternative waste processes.
This Brief and its Attachments will identify additional facts and problems (intimately related to the subject permit via input/discharge) with DOE's programs at the INEEL site that the IDEQ may or may not have considered in its deliberations. Specifically, this brief will explain the unique nature of INTEC and related waste treatment/disposal operations flooding and the resultant dispersal of pollution via CPP-659/1659 and connected waste processing units into the Snake River Plain Aquifer (SRPA) and the resultant public health issues that imperil Idahoans that rely on the Snake River Aquifer to sustain their lives and property. Processing of this radioactive waste at this specific location poses an immediate threat to public health and safety which warrants the IDEQ's full consideration.
EDI participated substantively in the development of David McCoy's Appellant Brief, and therefore request that McCoy's Appellant Brief be incorporated by reference and by attachment into EDI's Amicus Brief as Attachment A. McCoy's Brief offers a fully developed legal and evidentiary argument on the inadequacies of DOE's RCRA Debris Processing permit application.
It is EDI's position that these additional facts support a finding that the IDEQ should deny DOE's RCRA CPP-659/1659 permit as currently submitted based on the arguments presented below and attached.
IDEQ's Notice of Order (published 12/18/01) granting limited review stipulates that: ".... the issue to be addressed by the review will be limited to : Whether new information submitted by the Department of Energy reflecting flood plain mapping requires changes in the permit. No other matters will be considered by the Director in his review of the petition." [emphasis added]
EDI challenges these arbitrary and capricious restraints, however, absent any legal citations in Idaho Administrative Regulations, or Idaho Code pertaining to the public comment venue prescribed by the IDEQ Notice. EDI additionally protests that as a regulatory agency, it limits the exchange of crucial information that impacts all INEEL radioactive and hazardous waste storage, treatment, and disposal operations within the Big Lost River flood-plain. EDI protests IDEQ's attempt to consider the Volume 18 Permit as unrelated to the facilities such as the Process Waste Equipment Evaporator, the Tank Farm, the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator, the ICDF and the new percolation ponds which are near to and will be utilized by buildings CPP-659/1659. The effect of flooding at INEEL has not been considered for these other facilities which are linked to operations of the Debris Processing facility.
EDI contends that IDEQ improperly reached a final decision to approve the Debris Processing RCRA Part B Permit prior to provision of a reopened public comment period in this matter. IDEQ has again denied the public a full opportunity for comment and response to those comments by IDEQ prior to a decision to issue the permit. Procedurally, IDEQ skipped a crucial legal step by not offering the public a new comment period prior to the appeal process. IDEQ also failed to enforce the provisions under 10 CFR 1022 et seq. for early public notice and hearings for actions within the flood-plain.
As a public interest organization, EDI finds IDEQ's intransigence to these broader issues unconscionable. Moreover, IDEQ's requirement that only "Amicus Briefs" from the public will be reviewed effectively intimidates members of the public who otherwise would offer written comments. Amicus Briefs are "friend of the court" submittals. (34) There are no court proceedings here! This is a State of Idaho administrative procedural process, and the use of Amicus Briefs as a comment criteria is nothing less than IDEQ's effort to scare off any public comment on the permit issue. The proceeding is before the Director of the IDEQ which has a vested interest in permit approval. Additionally, IDEQ's unwillingness to put copies of DOE's responsive flood documents in the Administrative Record Repositories or on IDEQ's website further demonstrates the agency's desperate attempt to restrict public involvement in this permit issue. These IDEQ actions logically force the question of whose interests are actually being protected by the agency mandated to protect the environmental, health, and safety of Idahoans.
These issues must also be viewed in the context of a grossly inadequate DOE response to the National Environmental Policy Act requirement of comprehensive Environmental Impact Statements. IDEQ also appears to have forgotten about applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements (ARARS) that it is mandated to enforce. The INEEL site-wide Programmatic EIS offers less than a 1/3 rd page of text on the flooding issue. (35) The INEEL High-Level Waste EIS offers about one page of text on INTEC flooding issues. (36) This is also a violation, as discussed later, 10 CFR 1022.4(c) and Executive Order 11988, that requires of any DOE "crucial action plan," a generation of a 500 year (0.2% ) flood-plain analysis. The Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1500 et seq. (42 U.S.C. 1502.25(a) requires that all nearby and related operations should be included in NEPA analyses and the EIS must address all relevant Executive Orders. This has not been done. Additionally, CEQ requires compliance with all relevant Executive Orders. Executive Order No. 11988 (May 24, 1977) Guidance for Implementation of the Order is contained in the Flood-plain Management Guidelines of the U.S. Water Resources Council (40 FR 6030, Feb. 10, 1978). Also Executive Order No. 11990 Protection of Wetlands (May 24, 1977) and CEQ section 1502.25 (a) requires preparation of a draft Environmental Impact Statement concurrently with and integrated with Executive Orders. DOE has not carried out this requirement of integrating an EIS with carrying out the mandates of E.O. 11988 and 11990 as per 10 CFR 1022 et seq.
This permit for Debris and HEPA filter leaching process is misguided because it "violates the cardinal principle of radioactive waste treatment; namely, containing radioactivity rather than spreading it." (37) Specifically, the process employed is aqueous, and generates large quantities of radioactive and hazardous liquids that then are "processed" in the un-unpermitted-non-compliant Process Equipment Waste Evaporator (PEWE), Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal (LET&D) High-Level Liquid Waste Evaporator (HLLWE), and subsequently disposed in Percolation Pond operations at INTEC. The Percolation Ponds themselves violate DOE Order 5400.5 related to phasing out existing soil column discharges. (38) Utilizing the soil column for waste disposal becomes extremely problematic when floods flush contaminates into the underlying groundwater.
A safer process (otherwise required by NEPA to consider alternatives) from a public health and environmental safety perspective would be super compaction and storage until a safe permanent waste repository is established to take the subject permit waste. DOE refuses to acknowledge this alternative and has performed no cost benefit or environmental analysis of possible alternatives to process the liquid waste in non-compliant operations and dump the solid residuals in non-compliant landfills on the INEEL site rather than present the required environmental analysis. See ICDF discussion below.
Background
According to U.S. Geologic Survey Studies (USGS): "The need for flood control at the INEL [sic] has been recognized since the early 1950's when the Test Reactor Area and the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant were threatened by localized flooding that occurred because of ice dams in the Big Lost River. Repeated threats of flooding in the late 1960's, early 1970's, and early 1980's occurred when the Big Lost River filled Playas 1 and 2 and overflowed into Playa 3 near the [Test Area North] Loss-of-Fluid Test facility. High stream-flow and air temperatures as low as -47 degrees F in the winter of 1983-84 caused ice jams that imposed a danger of localized flooding." (39)
"Prior to irrigation development in adjacent valleys, the area now within the INEEL boundaries was the final destination of three important perennial streams, the Big Lost River, the Little Lost River, and Birch Creek. These streams emptied into playas and sinks on the floor of the 90 square kilometer area occupied during the Pleistocene by Lake Terreton. Although difficult to imagine given the current flows in the Big Lost River, land form remnants of a Pleistocene flood through Box Canyon on the INEEL's west side implicate that flood as the third most powerful known." (40)
DOE and the state and EPA regulators have included the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) into the INTEC Record of Decision, so ICDF flood related information is germane to the subject CPP-659/1659 RCRA permit by virtue of its immediate proximity. EPA consultants had the following to say about the history of the INTEC/ICDF area based on their site visit and analysis of the excavation material that showed the Big Lost River channel was previously under the INTEC/ICDF.
"Stockpiled ICDF excavation material was observed adjacent to the test pad area. Some of the materials observed were clean gravels with very little fine-grained material present. In one portion of the stockpile the gravels were several inches in diameter, approximating cobble size, rather than gravels. The implication of the presence of these fist sized sediments is that the Big Lost River has, in its past, produced high energy environments of erosion and deposition in the area of the present landfill excavation. The river would have to have left its current channel and carved through the adjacent overbank deposits with sufficient force to carry and then deposit cobbles greater than 3 to 4, and some up to 6 inches, in diameter. Significant water volumes and velocities are required to produce high energy deposits comprised of gravels and cobbles of this size range. These observations lead to the conclusion that location and design of the landfill in an area that has experienced fluvial flooding events of sufficient magnitude to produce these type of gravel deposits should consider the evidence of past events."
"The gravel and sand horizons comprising the majority of the sediments exposed in the ICDF excavation do not appear to be laterally extensive but are likely elongated channel deposits that extend roughly parallel to the present location of the Big Lost River channel. The path of the former stream channel left remnants of its passage outside the river's present course as repeated channel cut and fill sedimentary features. Channel deposits are typified by coarse gravels deposited on the high energy side and finer grained gravels and sands on the lower energy side of the former stream channel." "One additional consideration, is that the thick sequence of predominantly gravel sediments observed at the ICDF site are the results of historic and repeated erosion and sedimentary redeposition processes associated with the Big Lost River. The ability of the Big Lost River to recharge these deposits during periods when the Big Lost River is flowing, or flooding, has not been investigated. If the river were to recharge the paleochannels when it is flowing above a particular stage then the resulting saturated sediments would be likely to provide lateral flow potential. Although extensive saturated conditions were not observed in the excavation at the time of the visit, the Big Lost River is not currently flowing and, therefore, its ability to infiltrate former channel deposits is somewhat speculative. Infiltration of paleochannels in the type of depositional environment observed the ICDF excavation pit could, in the opinion of Gannett Fleming, be considered a consequence of resumption of flow of the Big Lost River." (41)
CPP-659/1656 Permit Issues
The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a "Response to the Department of Environmental Quality [IDEQ] Request for Additional Flood-plain Information for Units Defined in the Volume 18 HWMA/RCRA Part B Permit application for INEEL, January 18, 2001." (42) This DOE (EDF-1747) report cites on page 2: "In 1989, INEEL published a report [Koslow (1986)] containing calculated flow volumes and water-surface elevations which occur during a peak flow in the Big Lost River at the INEEL. (43) This INEEL study included the assumption that the 100-year peak flow and failure of Mackay Dam occur simultaneously, and thereby estimated that the peak flow in the Big Lost River is equal to 28,500 cubic feet per second [cf/s] at the INEEL diversion dam." "Presently, the water surface profile associated with a 28,500 cf/s flow is considered to be an upper bound on potential flooding at the INEEL. The particular water surface profile obtained from the INEEL study is used as a basis for the present [HWMA/RCRA Permit] analysis." (Ibid )
The topographic map [intec_permit_1999_200ft-el_v4, date drawn: 9/11/2001] provided to IDEQ by DOE does not satisfy the requirements for a accurate flood plain map because the map is not based on adequate data which includes both riverine and overland flow information. 40 CFR § 270.14 requires the use of a flood plain map which maps the flow of flooding from "any source". (See, 40 CFR 264.18(b)(2)(i ) ). A disclaimer on the topographic map of the INTEC area for the Volume 18 permit map provided by DOE states that the "Flood elevation indicated in this report and on this map is considered by DOE to be interim, pending issuance of a final flood plain determination under 10 CFR 1022." The elevation shown on the topographic map of 4916 feet at INTEC is incorrect if the HLW/EIS figure of 4917 is instead utilized.
The 12/99 INEEL High-level Waste Environmental Impact Statement (HLW/EIS) cites (in two different sections) the same Koslow (1986) report to establish the Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) at INTEC at 66,830 cf/s, reaching an elevation of 4,917 feet above sea level. (44) This represents a completely, and radically different interpretation by separate DOE officials of the data from the same Koslow (1986) report. Specifically, the HLW/EIS interpretation of 66,830 cf/s compared to the EDF-1747 report interpretation of 28,500 cf/s. Additionally the EDF-1747 report, again citing Koslow, states the flow rate at 2.2 feet/sec while the HLW/EIS cites 2.7 feet/sec. This flow rate is crucial due to the resulting erosion to facilities during a flood. "If, as a result of this [HLW]EIS, DOE decides to build facilities within the flood plain at INTEC, then some form of mitigation would be necessary to assure that INTEC facilities would not be impacted by localized flooding." (45) The 1/18/01 INEEL Bechtel EDF-1747 cover letter to IDEQ states "For the purposes of Volume 18 permit application, all units (with the exception of CPP-666) are in the 100-year flood-plain. This determination is based on Volume 3 (Revision 6, July 1993) of the RCRA Part B Permit application for the INEEL which currently contains a report generated in 1986, EGG-EP-7184, entitled "Flood Routing Analysis for a Failure of Mackay Dam"
DOE's report goes on to state: "In the INEEL [EDF-1747 ] study, 57,740 cf/s was estimated to occur at Mackay Dam. The flow is attenuated downstream, and the INEEL diversion dam located in the southwestern part of the INEEL was estimated to receive 28,500 cf/s."
Why are these conflicting 100-year flood numbers important? These conflicting numbers are important because they go to issues of DOE's credibility with respect to the use of the flood-plain and the lack of safety margins which exist for INTEC facilities within the flood-plain. The deliberate selection by DOE of lower estimated flood levels for the Volume 18 Part B Permit is indicative that the INTEC New Waste Calciner Facility (CPP-659) is not capable of sustaining a major flood and also meeting regulatory requirements under 40 CFR 270.14, 40 CFR 264.18, and 10 CFR 1022. EDI contends that INTEC (CPP-659 and related waste influent/effluent units) do not meet regulatory requirements. The huge discrepancy and contradictions between the interpretation of the available research reports coupled with DOE's contrived selection of studies and manipulation of data to achieve lower peak flood elevations at INTEC provides grounds for denial of the proposed Debris RCRA permit.
The Volume 18 Debris Processing liquid effluent is linked to the ICDF, but the two processes are being considered in isolation to prevent the public from realizing and analyzing the environmental relationship of these and other facilities to the flood-plain. The new flood-plain information must necessarily be considered in relationship to the Debris Processing and the ICDF and new percolation ponds. DOE's lengthy history of activities which have contaminated the groundwater must be brought to a halt.
The Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) issued a Record of Decision in October 1999 to, among other things, construct an on-site mixed hazardous and radioactive processing and waste dump. (46) This decision was made within the Superfund (CERCLA) process with the concurrence of the State of Idaho and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Initially, this was welcome news since the Environmental Defense Institute (EDI) has for years criticized DOE's illegal waste "disposal" practices in dumps that would not even meet municipal garbage landfill regulations let alone those which regulate radioactive and hazardous chemical waste. After detailed analysis of the Record of Decision, it is clear that DOE plans to repeat the mistakes of the past by siting the new dump (called the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility) (ICDF) not only in a flood zone, but over top of Idaho's sole source Snake River Aquifer which sustains more than 200,000 families.
In short, the issue is not the construction of the new dump, but the issue is where it is to be built on the INEEL site. EDI's position is that there are credible alternative sites on the INEEL that are not over the aquifer or in a flood zone. See discussion below on alternate sites not fully considered by DOE. The ICDF siting question is germane to the Debris Processing Permit due to the fact that solid/liquid effluent will be sent to the ICDF and the new INTEC percolation ponds, and is inconsistent with RCRA's "cradle to grave" requirement for hazardous waste management.
Additionally, DOE is violating other environmental laws by claiming that the CERCLA process waives the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) among other laws. Attorneys conversant in the regulations say CERCLA only waives the permitting and NEPA requirements in the direct removal and remediation of a contaminated site. CERCLA does not in this case waive the RCRA permitting or NEPA requirements on a major $140 million ICDF dump project. Specifically, the equivalent requirements under NEPA would require DOE to evaluate, in an Environmental Impact Statement, the credible alternative siting locations for the ICDF. This was never done. Yes, DOE evaluated alternatives for on-site versus off-site disposal.......but not alternative on-site locations. Once again, the legal requirements are obfuscated not only by DOE but by the State of Idaho and the Environmental Protection Agency. Since this appears to be a "done deal" between DOE and the regulators demonstrated by IDEQ's curtailment of procedures to involve and protect the public, it appears the public's only recourse is litigation. Once again the public's rights have been trampled.
From a review of the available and numerous US Geological Survey (USGS), and other reports related to INEEL flooding scenarios and flood control infrastructures, it is clear that DOE and the regulators ignored this information. See discussion below on additional reports not utilized by DOE. Moreover, DOE ignored the USGS recommendation that additional analyses must be conducted prior to any final siting decisions being made for new waste internment and disposition of existing buried waste. Specifically, USGS recommended a two dimensional model to expand the 1998 USGS one dimension model to include the upper 95% confidence flow estimates of 11,600 cubic feet per second for the Big Lost River 100-year flood, and include modeling for the upper range limit of the 500-year estimated flow rate in the Big Lost River flood plain on the INEEL. (47) Modeling based on the upper 95% confidence flow rate would change the topographic map and/or coupled with excavation elevations more than likely result in inclusion of the ICDF, the new percolation ponds and other structures at INEEL being within the flood plain.
A 1972 USGS study notes: "The need for flood control at the INEL [sic] has been recognized since the early 1950's when the Test Reactor Area and the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant were threatened by localized flooding that occurred because of ice dams in the Big Lost River. Repeated threats of flooding in the late 1960's, early 1970's, and early 1980's occurred when the Big Lost River filled Playas 1 and 2 and overflowed into Playa 3 near the Loss-of-Fluid Test facility. High stream-flow and air temperatures as low as -47 degrees F in the winter of 1983-84 caused ice jams that imposed a danger of localized flooding." (48) The 1972 USGS study notes: "First, a tentative hypothesis may be made that Mackay Dam may be overtopped and fail due to floods of not much greater recurrence interval than that of the maximum floods considered in the paper [15 to 300-year recurrence intervals]." (49)
DOE is constructing the ICDF as a step toward meeting regulatory requirements in the Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) Subtitle-C hazardous waste disposal criteria. After 25 years of thumbing its nose at RCRA, DOE finally is making a gesture toward compliance after five decades of mismanagement of its waste streams that cause massive environmental contamination. Estimated cleanup costs of this INEEL debacle are in the range of $21.4 billion, which will come out of our pockets as taxpayers. DOE's decision to finally comply with RCRA is marred by the wrongheaded choice of location, when other on-site locations would not pose the same risks to the aquifer that is already severely contaminated from INEEL waste.
DOE is constructing the ICDF immediately south of the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) also now called INTEC mainly for economic reasons. It is close to the ICPP where much of the waste will be generated and it is near/over existing waste water percolation ponds which are on the Superfund cleanup list, and it is over extensive soil contamination caused from ICPP stack releases. In other words, "kill three wasted birds with one stone."
The US Geological Survey released a 1998 report that modeled the median 100-year flow rates in the Big Lost River (that flows by the ICPP) down stream of the INEEL Diversion Dam (6,220 cf/s). The USGS report cross section number 22 at the ICPP puts the median flood elevation at 4,912 feet. (50) Again, this is only the mean flow rate (as opposed to the maximum rate of 11,600 cf/s) of just a 100-year flood, and not including any additional cascading events like the failure of Mackay Dam. The USGS flood map shows the northern half of the ICPP under water. There are only five-foot differences between the ICDF (south end of ICPP) elevation of 4,917 feet and the USGS predicted elevation of 4,912 feet through the middle of the ICPP. The USGS study also employed current modeling techniques and plotted 37 separate cross sections on the INEEL site. The ICPP as a whole is about as flat as a table top with only a couple feet change in elevation north to south. (51) The crucial point here is that even the slightest variation in a Big Lost River flood would put the ICDF underwater assuming the dump was on the surface. Proportionally less variation in floods would inundate the dump the deeper the ICDF is buried below the surrounding terrain.
An earlier USGS study in 1996 also estimated the flow range for the Big Lost River at the INEEL; "The upper and lower 95-percent confidence limits for the estimated 100-year peak flow were 11,600 and 3,150 cubic feet per second (cf/s), respectively." (52)
Since 1950, INEEL has experienced significant flooding events (localized and site-wide) in 1962, 1965, 1969, 1982, and 1984. In an effort to mitigate the flooding problem, DOE built a diversion dam on the Big Lost River that is designed to shunt flood waters to the south and away from INEEL facilities. USGS's 1998 report that modeled the mean (midrange) 100-year flow rate of 7,260 cf/s upstream of the INEEL diversion dam. USGS estimated that the Big Lost median flow rate downstream of the diversion dam at 6,220 cf/s with a thousand cf/s going down the diversion channel for a total median flow rate of 7,260 cf/s upstream of the INEEL diversion dam. (53) "This peak flow was routed down stream [of the Big Lost River] as if the INEEL diversion dam did not exist. On the basis of a structural analysis of the INEEL diversion dam (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) assumed the dam incapable of retaining high flows. The Corps indicated that the diversion dam could fail if flows were to exceed 6,000 cubic feet per second." (54)
This USGS study acknowledged that the northern half of the ICPP would be flooded with four feet of moving water, even at this midrange (mean) flow rate. If ICDF excavation goes two feet below present surfaces, it will be below the elevation of the mean 100-year flood zone. Plans are to excavate ICDF pits most of the entire 50 feet to bedrock.
Since the radioactive waste would be extremely hazardous for tens of thousands of years and flooding would flush contaminates down into the aquifer, a conservative risk assessment would model the upper 95-percent confidence limits for the estimated 100-year peak flow of 11,600 cf/s. USGS has proposed this additional research to DOE, but the Department is not willing to provide the funding. A USGS hydrologist notes, "The flow of 11,600 cfs represents the upper 95 percent confidence limit flow for the estimated 100-year peak flow (Kjelstrom and Berenbrock, 1996, p6). Future modeling needs are to model the area within this flow. We've expressed this to the INEEL and also have expressed that the WSPRO model used has limitations and that an application of more stringent models (two dimensional) is needed to refine and better delineate the extent of possible flooding of the Big Lost River." (55)
USGS estimates the mean 500-year Big Lost River flood rates at 9,680 cf/s (34% greater flow rate than the mean 100 year flood). (56) This 500-year flood would inundate the ICPP and surrounding area. These potential hazards are being ignored when making hazardous mixed radioactive waste internment decisions in these vulnerable areas despite the long-term consequences and the potential for additional aquifer contamination.
Cascading events also are not considered. This is known as a worst case scenario where one event triggers another event. For instance a 500-Year flood plus failure of Mackay Dam (built in 1917) resulting in estimated flows of 9,700 + 54,000 cubic feet per second respectively would be an example of a cascading event. Failure of Mackay Dam is non-speculative in view of the 1976 failure of the Teton Dam of similar construction and the fact that Mackay Dam lies within 11 miles of a major earthquake fault line that produced the 1983 Borah Peak 7.3 magnitude quake. An internal 1986 DOE report that analyzed the impact of Mackay Dam failure scenarios notes that, "Mackay Dam was not built to conform to seismic or hydrologic design criteria," and "the dam has experienced significant under seepage since its construction." (57) This EG&G study acknowledged that the ICPP, Naval Reactors Facility, and the Test Area North (LOFT) facilities would be flooded with at least four feet of water moving at three feet per second.
The 1998 USGS study did not consider cascading events but noted previous studies showing that failure of Mackay Dam alone would result in 6 feet of water at the INEEL Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) waste burial grounds. (58) Other studies recognized by USGS note that, "Rathburn (1989, 1991) estimated that the depth of water at the RWMC, resulting from a paleo-flood [early] of 2 to 4 million cf/s in the Big Lost River in Box Canyon and overflow areas, was 50-60 feet." "If Mackay Dam failed, Niccum estimated that peak flow at the ICPP would be at 30,000 cfs." (59) Comparing these flow rates with the USGS estimate 100-year mean flow of 6,220 cfs that would flood the north end of the ICPP with four feet of water, and a Mackay Dam failure becomes a real disaster potential with respect to the existing underground waste tanks and underground spent reactor fuel storage and other related CPP-659/1659 operations at the ICPP.
DOE is relying extensively on the Big Lost River Diversion Dam (located at the western INEEL boundary) to shunt major flood waters away from INEEL facilities. The last comprehensive analysis of this diversion dike system (below the diversion dam) was conducted by USGS in 1986 in a report titled Capacity of the Diversion Channel below the Flood Control Dam on the Big Lost River at the INEL. In this study USGS estimated a mean flow rate of 9,300 cf/s, 7,200 of which went into the diversion channel and "2,100 cf/s will pass through two low swells west of the main channel for a combined maximum diversion capacity of 9,300 cf/s." "A sustained flow at or above 9,300 cf/s could damage or destroy the dike banks by erosion. Overflow will first top the containment dike at cross section 1, located near the downstream control structure on the diversion dam." (60) This USGS study did not analyze the construction of the diversion dikes but they would likely fail as did the upstream diversion dam, built at the same time, that the Army Corps of Engineers found structurally deficient. "On the basis of a structural analysis of the INEEL diversion dam (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, written comments, 1997), the dam was assumed incapable of retaining high flows. The Corps indicated that the diversion dam could fail if flows were to exceed 6,000 cf/s. Possible failure mechanisms are: (1) erosion of the upstream face of the dam that results from high-flow velocities and loss of slope protections (rip-rap), (2) overtopping of the diversion dam by flows exceeding the capacity of the diversion channel and culverts, (3) piping and breaching of the diversion dam because of seepage around the culverts, and (4) instability of the dam and its foundation because of seepage." (61)
Failure of the diversion dam and/or the diversion channel dikes would also directly impact the Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC) waste burial grounds and the site of the Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment (AMWTP) that likely will receive CPP-659 Debris and HEPA Filter process waste. A 1986 USGS study shows the flood levels (at 7,200 cfs) in the Diversion Channel opposite the RWMC at 5056 feet above sea level. (62) The AMWTP permit shows building elevations at 5,019 and ground levels at the RWMC at 5,012. (63) That is a difference of some 37 feet between flood levels in the Diversion Channel and AMWTP buildings. In blunt terms 37 feet under water if the diversion channel dikes fail, which is likely given the poor construction of the diversion dam itself and the same construction applied to the diversion channel dikes.
Rather than address the 100-year flood coupled with Mackay Dam which DOE utilized for INTEC, the DOE avoids the Koslow and other studies for the RWMC by using an outdated 1993 Dames and Moore study which fails to address the 1986 Koslow report entirely. On the basis of the 1993 Dames and Moore study, the DOE makes the spurious claim that Building "WMF-676 is not located within a 100-year flood-plain." (AMWTF HWMA/RCRA Treatment Permit, page 18).
Just as DOE refused to consider the implications of the 1998 USGS study for INTEC, this is another example of the DOE pattern of picking and choosing studies to support the end goal of lower flood elevations or being outside the floodplain thus placing public health and safety at risk. The topographic map provided on the basis of the Dames and Moore study is wholly deficient as a true accurate and complete description for the floodplain at RWMC.
IDEQ must begin to recognize this endemic failure of the DOE to protect the aquifer and require DOE to comply with and fulfill the floodplain requirements at the numerous locations at INEEL. The only way to achieve this is for IDEQ to require a RCRA and 10 CFR 1022, NEPA type of comprehensive floodplain analysis for all facilities at INEEL rather than the piecemeal review of isolated, disconnected, counterfeit, inconsistent, self-serving analyses presented by DOE on a facility by facility basis. The abysmal 50-year history of failure of the DOE to responsibly deal with radioactive and hazardous wastes specifically in the floodplain should be halted by IDEQ. IDEQ should recognize that DOE is incapable of protecting the aquifer and that permitting more critical actions in the floodplain will only lead to additional failures and damage to the aquifer.]
The March 29, 1993 Dames and Moore "Flood Evaluation Study Radioactive Waste Management Complex Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho Falls, Idaho" used for the December 2001 Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project HWMA/RCRA Treatment Permit, fails to reference the 1986 Koslow 100-year flood with the collapse of Mackay Dam scenario. The Flood Evaluation Study (p. 7) only examines flood values for "The watershed area contributing surface water runoff to the RWMC is approximately four square miles (2,592 acres). This area is not affected by the INEL diversion structure on the Big Lost River." Even without the addition of the flows postulated by 1986 Koslow study, the RWMC structures may not be able to withstand the flood from the four square miles of watershed. The 1993 Study states (p. 66): "Field inspection of the dikes, railroad embankments, and culverts indicates that these structures may not be able to withstand a severe flood event. Design details of these structures are not readily available. If any of these structures fails, then the attenuation considered in routing flood hydrographs through the site drainage system will be partially or completely lost. This will result in comparatively higher flood peaks at the downstream locations. If the breaches or breaches occur during a storm event they will generate flood waves similar to a dam-break situation. ... [T]he resulting flood peak may approach or exceed the PMF peak. ... Evaluation of the impacts of such contingencies is beyond the scope of this study."
A 1976 USGS report notes, "The burial ground is within 2 miles (3.2 km) of the Big Lost River and the surface is approximately 40 feet (12 m) lower than the present river channel. Sediments in the burial ground contain grains and pebbles of limestone and quartzite, suggesting that in recent geologic past, flood waters of the Big Lost River flowed through the burial ground basin. Two eroded notches or 'wind-gaps' in the basalt ridge bordering the west of the burial ground also suggest past Big Lost River floods." "A large diversion system on the Big Lost River was constructed by the AEC to control flood waters by diverting water into ponding Areas A, B, C, and D. The nearest of these, Area B is less than a mile [south] from and about 30 feet (9m) higher in elevation than the burial ground." (64)
USGS Arco Hills SE and Big Southern Butte quadrangle topographic maps clearly show the RWMC flooding vulnerability as do other USGS reports that note, "If [diversion] dike 2 [at ponding Area B] fails, large flows will drain directly toward the solid radioactive waste burial grounds." (65) These vulnerabilities must be taken into consideration when DOE attempts to leave the buried transuranic waste at the RWMC and not exhume and relocate it to a safe permanent repository.
Building dams around the INEEL CERCLA Disposal Facility (ICDF) as was done at the RWMC is not an acceptable flood protection answer because lateral water migration will go under the dams and local precipitation will be held in exacerbating the leachate conditions. The liner of the ICDF will not be capable of maintaining integrity with the increased hydraulic pressure during a flood because liners are only capable of blocking what minimal surface water may leak past the cap and infiltrate the waste. There are legitimate reasons why dumps (even municipal garbage dumps) are not allowed by statute in flood zones or above sole source aquifers. Dams by definition are only functional if there is regular maintenance which cannot be assumed once DOE ends institutional control of INEEL in a hundred years. Dumping hazardous waste on top of the ground and mounding the cover over it will result in the cap eroding over the long-term which again is unacceptable. Regulator's contention that there is a degree of efficiency in co-locating the ICDF with the ICPP percolation ponds that they must be remediated along with the "windblown" soil contamination area around the percolation ponds not only defies' common sense, but is also illegal.
DOE is not utilizing an internal study that identified at least two such sites (on the INEEL) where the Lemhi Range meets the Snake River Plain that are not over the aquifer. (66) DOE has not seriously considered these alternative sites as would normally be required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), stating that the sites were eliminated from consideration due to increased seismic activity. There is no documented evidence of this alternative site seismic analysis. No empirical risk assessment was conducted to compare the relative risk of a location over a sole source aquifer and in a flood plain (ICPP) as opposed to a site with a slightly higher seismic risk not over the aquifer or in a flood zone (Lemhi Range terminus). Other credible options include purchasing land contiguous to the northern end of the INEEL site near the terminus of the Bitterroot Range that also would be off the aquifer and not in a flood zone and have more soil cover over the bedrock.
Another misguided project (recipient of the subject Debris Processing Permit) outlined in DOE's October 1999 Record of Decision is the construction of new ICPP process waste percolation ponds midway between ICPP and Central Facilities Area to the south. (67)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission restrictions prohibiting citing radioactive waste disposal dumps on 100-year flood plains must be observed. [ NRC 10 CFR ss 61.50] This NRC regulation applies for all radioactive waste and mixed radioactive waste, which is the case at INEEL. The reason for these restrictions is because the flood water will leach the contaminates out of the waste and flush the pollution more rapidly into the aquifer. Since these wastes will remain toxic for tens of thousands of years, they must be disposed of responsibly in a safe permanent repository.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission restrictions must be kept in mind also with respect to the ICPP high-level waste tanks that are some forty feet underground as well as the underground spent reactor fuel storage and calcine storage bins at the ICPP. Water acts as a moderator and if the underground spent fuel vaults are flooded, it could cause a criticality. All of these underground high-level waste sites are extremely vulnerable. Former ICPP workers recall stacking sandbags six feet high around the plant during a Spring flood about ten years ago. The added external hydrologic pressure on the high-level waste tank concrete vaults could collapse the vaults and the tanks inside, and thus release the contents. These risks must be considered when DOE decides to leave the high-level waste tank sediments permanently in place as a cost cutting measure.
The ICDF, siting, engineering design, and waste acceptance criteria (WAC) must be developed with public involvement through a free and open discussion. The legal requirements of the process are spelled out in the National Environmental Policy Act that requires Environmental Impact Statements and public hearings. Only un-containerized wastes that can be compacted during placement should be allowed so as to minimize subsidence caused by container decomposition. Biodegradable, VOC, collapsible, soluble, TRU, or Greater than Class C Low-level, and Alpha-low-level waste must also be excluded from the ICDF dump and sent off-site. Prior to completing the ICDF Title II Design, workshops should be convened for stakeholders to comment on the proposal in addition to the NEPA requirements. Waste Acceptance Criteria maximum contaminate concentration levels must be determined from waste sampling prior to being mixed with any stabilizing materials. In other words, "dilution is not the solution to pollution".
USGS reports identified factors favoring downward waste migration. "In order for waste isotopes to be carried downward by water, four basic requirements are needed: 1.) availability of water, 2.) contact of the water with the waste, 3.) solubility or suspendability of the waste in water, 4.) permeability in the geologic media to allow water flow downward." (68) This USGS report describes in detail how all four conditions are met at INEEL including the solubility factor where they note "Hagan and Miner (1970) leached five different categories of solid waste from Rocky Flats [the main source of plutonium in the RWMC] with ground water from the INEL and Rocky Flats and measured the plutonium concentrations and pH of the leachate. They found the highest Pu-239 concentration in leachates from the acidic-graphite wastes, 62,000 to 80,000 ug/l plutonium or (3.8 x 10 9 to 4.9 x 10 9 pCi/L)." [Ibid]
The most reliable indicators of contaminate migration are onsite sampling data. Cesium-137, plutonium-238,-239,-240 were all found at the 240-foot interbeds under the RWMC. [IDO-22056@74] Forty-one % of the samples from the 240 foot interbeds contained radionuclides. [Ibid.@87] Other literature confirmation of plutonium at 240 feet includes: "Radionuclides (including Pu-238.-239.-240, Am-241, Cs-137, Sr-90) have been detected in soils and in sedimentary interbeds to a depth of 240 feet beneath the RWMC, (Hodge et al, 1989)." "Positive values for Pu-238,-239,-240 were detected in samples obtained from the 240 foot interbed in bore hole DO2."[DOE/ID-10183@134-145][DOE/ID/12082(88) @14-16] Radionuclides are also confirmed in the aquifer under the RWMC. [EG&G-WTD-9438@25] USGS water sampling data at the 600 foot levels, expressed in pico curies per liter (pCi/l) show:
Groundwater Sampling Data at 600 Feet Under RWMC
| Nuclide | Concentration pCi/L | Drinking Water Std. pCi/L |
| Tritium | 10,000.00 | 20,000.00 |
| Cobalt-57 | 48.00 | 1,000.00 |
| Cobalt-60 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Cesium-137 | 400.00 | 119.00 |
| Plutonium-238 | 9.00 | 7.02 |
| Plutonium-239-240 | 0.14 | 62.10 |
| Americium-241 | 15.00 | 6.34 |
| Strontium-90 | 10.00 | 8.00 |
[IDO-22056 @66] * The drinking water standard for gross alpha (total of all alpha emitters) is 15 pCi/l.
For more information on the contaminate migration from INEEL buried waste at the RWMC see EDI Citizens Guide to INEEL page 130 available on request.
ICDF site selection is illegal under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) rules that prohibit siting of radioactive waste dumps in 100-year flood plains (10 CFR 61.50) which the agencies are obliged to conform to if their commitment to Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement (ARAR) is genuine. Both RCRA and NRC regulatory apply to INEEL waste management of its waste.
USGS conducted an extensive study in 1998 that defined the upper and lower 95% confidence level on the flow rates for a 100-year flood.
1. The upper rate is estimated at 11,600 cfs and the lower rate is 3,150 cfs
2. USGS chose for some unknown reason (perhaps pressure from DOE) to plot only the mean flow rate (average between upper and lower) of 6,220 cfs. DOE plotted the map and not the upper flood limit in USGS. The USGS is not listed as the agency on the Flood Map Legend that did the plotting. The INEEL Spatial Analysis Laboratory is on the Legend, not USGS. Who is supposed to be responsible for plotting the map?
3. USGS assumptions base on previous Army Corps of Engineers and other EG&G studies that the Diversion Dam would fail with flows in excess of 6,000 cfs so the diversion dam was mostly discounted.
4. USGS plotting of the mean 100 year flow rate does not define the flood zone. It only shows where the likely areas are that will be effected during an average flood. This mean plot should never be used for making major facility siting decisions.
5. The appropriate definition of the 100 year flood zone is to plot the upper bound 95% confidence level flow rate, which USGS attempted to convince DOE to fund, but were refused funding.
6. No credible empirical rationale can be presented to define the 100 year flood zone based on the plotting of the mean flow rate as DOE and the regulators are doing.
7. Given that the upper bound 95% confidence level flow rate is nearly twice what the mean flow rate is a significant spread and a percentage of error should have been provided.
[8. If the upper bound 95% confidence level flow rate were used the topographic map might indicate more structures at INEEL which would fall within the floodplain.]
The apparent top of the ICDF berm is about 10 feet above the USGS plotted mean of the 100 year flood at INTEC. Absent a through USGS study that plots the upper level flow rate and the resultant flooding given the near level topography of the INTEC environs, there is a lot of uncertainty about whether the berm is high enough.
Additional uncertainty is the ability of the berm to survive the three-feet-per-second rush of the flood and the erosion that would be expected to occur. (69)
The ten-foot berm would also be expected to erode over time from natural wind and precipitation which would eliminate that minimal flood barrier. Who is going to be around in 200 years to maintain that berm? If the berm was breached, is the liner adequate to maintain integrity with a hydriodic head of nearly 50 feet?
Five-hundred-year flood MEAN is estimated at 9,600 cfs.....Claims of 1,000 year durability of ICDF mandates inclusion of the 500-year flood impact, cascading event of Mackay Dam.....++ 54,000 cfs.
Cost benefit analysis did not take into account long-term impact on the potential further contamination of the sole source Snake River Aquifer and how it would affect health and safety not to mention agriculture.
The debris processing facility action is a critical action as defined by 1022.4 ( c) involving highly volatile, toxic or water reactive materials in the flood-plain. The critical action flood-plain is defined as the 500-year (0.2 percent) flood-plain. No 500-year flood analysis has been performed for the Debris Processing facility or for the other facilities housed within or near to CPP-659/1659, such as the Tank Farm, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator and the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator.
No adequate NEPA or 10 CFR 1022 environmental analysis exists for flood-plain issues which would link the Debris Processing Facility to the hazards associated with flood-plain issues which could cause failure at other facilities at INTEC including, but not limited to, facilities such as the tank farm facility (floating of 300,000 gallon tanks) and the New Waste Calciner Facility calcine bin sets. SPERT-III and SPERT-IV overland flow analyses are not complete (in internal review) and available for public review (IDEQ/INEEL Quarterly Meeting June 8, 2000- Neil C. Hutten).
The public is entitled to consider flood-plain issues related to the Debris Processing facility in relation to the above or other facilities, such as the Liquid Effluent Treatment and Disposal facility, Process Equipment Waste Evaporator and the High Level Liquid Waste Evaporator. The new INTEC waste percolation ponds and the ICDF landfill in the flood zone may also receive some of the Debris Process facility effluent.
Yet another example of INTEC operations that affect the Debris permit flood vulnerability is the underground reactor fuel storage that if flooded could cause a criticality compromising CPP-659/1659 operations.
Spent nuclear reactor fuel in ICPP-749 Underground "Dry" Storage Facility has 78.40 metric tons heavy metal (MTHM) (not to be confused with the actual weight of the fuel) in 218 underground dry vaults, built between 1971 and 1987. One hundred twenty-eight of the 218 dry vaults contain fuel from Peach Bottom Core I and the Fermi Blanket stored in aluminum canisters. The carbon steel liners of the 61 first generation vaults have undergone significant corrosion due to seepage of moisture. Fifty-nine of these vaults contain fuel in aluminum canisters. Some of these canisters have been inspected and show moderate corrosion. Gas samples show some canisters may be breached but there is no current indication of failed fuel clad. Water that collects in these vaults may leak to ground. The dry well design offers limited confinement capabilities, since it must be opened during fuel handling and inspection. A significant hazard associated with the first generation wells is the potential for carbide-water reactions. If the fuel is damaged and water is allowed to contact it, the carbide-bearing fuels could react exothermally with water to produce acetylene and oxygen. Acetylene together with oxygen forms an explosive mixture.[DOE(a)] Other 1994 inspections found degraded Peach Bottom fuel and degrading aluminum fuel cans and baskets at ICPP-749. [SNF Vulnerability]
The following table showing spent fuel storage inventories are expressed in metric tons heavy metal (MTHM), which means only the weight of the plutonium, uranium, and thorium in the fuel is noted. This MTHM nomenclature is new (post-1994) to DOE since previous fuel inventories were expressed in total mass (i.e. weight of fuel element fissile material, cladding and end caps). DOE's stated reason for this change in nomenclature is that it more accurately describes the hazardous constituents. Notwithstanding the usefulness of the MTHM number, all parts (i.e.. entire assembly) of the fuel represents a significant hazard, and therefore the total mass number should be predominately used because it more accurately describes the total hazard. Inventories of spent nuclear fuel can be expressed with at least six different nomenclatures. In addition to the previously discussed MTHM and total mass, there are volume, number of storage units, uranium mass, fissile mass. Of the total (1,373 cubic meters) spent nuclear fuel volume held by DOE, INEEL has 53.5%.
Of the total (78 metric tons) spent nuclear fuel fissile mass held by DOE, INEEL has 49.9%. [Hoskins 7/11/94]
The HLWEIS page c.4-28 states: "A major flood can cause damage to the facility structure and subsequent equipment failures, thereby causing a release of materials from the facility to the environment. In particular, [calcine] bin set # 1 has been determined, by analysis, to be statically unstable. Under flood conditions, the berm surrounding bin set # 1 could be undermined with subsequent collapse of the cover onto the four internal vaults. Material released from the vaults would then be transported by flood waters to the surrounding area and released to the environment as dust once the flood recedes. Early predictions of the frequency of such a flood were 1.0 x 10 (-4) at a maximum elevation of 4916.6 feet mean sea level well above the 4912 feet needed to wet the bottom of the bin set # 1 berm." No arguments have been made that preclude the 1.0 x 10(-4) from being an upper bound."
Decades of Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL) use of the Snake River Aquifer as a cesspool for radioactive and chemical waste disposal has resulted in contamination of this sole water source that sustains over 200,000 Idahoans. INEEL and its contractor Bechtel thumb their noses at regulations prohibiting this illegal activity, and state and federal environmental regulators sit on their collective hands. A recent scientific report by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER) states: "Nuclear waste dumped at INEEL is polluting the Snake River Plain Aquifer, the primary source of drinking water for 200,000 people..." According to this IEER report, plutonium from INEEL has migrated into the aquifer at levels of 24 pico curies per liter (pc/L) when the EPA MCL limit is 15 pC/L. (70)
An example of continued violations at INEEL are confirmed in a recent internal Department of Energy Headquarters safety report that acknowledges that two million gallons per day of hazardous chemical and radioactive waste water is being dumped into old unlined percolation ponds that are on the Superfund cleanup list. These ponds (also used by CPP-659) have been in use for decades despite the fact that they contaminate the underlying Snake River sole source aquifer with radioactive plutonium, iodine, strontium, cesium, and tritium, in addition to a vast array of toxic chemicals and heavy metals like mercury. [DOE/ID10660@5-6]
Regulators, in the INTEC CERCLA (Operable Unit 3-13) Record Of Decision told INEEL to stop using the percolation ponds by December 2003 because the water leaches contaminates in the underlying soil column down to the aquifer. This aquifer pollution significantly exceeds EPA's drinking water standards. Despite this, regulators granted INEEL a dumping extension to the year 2004 without any public notice or opportunity for public comment. This is a violation of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act and the Clean Water Act.
Two of these old percolation ponds are located at INEEL Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP), now called INTEC, operated for INEEL by Bechtel BBWI Idaho. DOE Headquarters Report states: "INTEC continues to discharge about two million gallons of liquid effluents per day to the existing contaminated soil column under the percolation pond. These ongoing discharges are contrary to DOE Order 5400.5 paragraph 3.c.(2), which states that liquid discharges, even though uncontaminated, are prohibited in inactive release areas [i.e. old peculation ponds] to prevent the further spread of radionuclides previously deposited." (71) [DOE@25]
Dumping two million gallons per day for three more years in the old percolation pond amounts to about 2.19 billion gallons of waste water that could flush most of the contaminants in the soil column down to the aquifer and then Bechtel can claim they no longer need to clean up the site because the contaminate levels are below regulatory concern. In fact, the ICPP Remediation Record of Decision stipulates that the contaminated sediments are not to be exhumed but simply covered over and capped. [DOE/ID-10660@iv]
As reported in Energy Daily by George Lobsenz: "INEEL officials had evaluated a closed-loop system for handling service water effluent, but concluded the cost of increased evaporation efforts and other measures was prohibitive-on the order of $830 million." INEEL contractors are paid to pollute, they're paid bonuses when cost cutting measures increase pollution, and finally, they are paid to clean up the mess they created in the first place.
Another internal INEEL report acknowledges illegal dumping in the old ICPP Percolation Ponds from the spent nuclear fuel storage pool filter system back flushes. This process cleans contaminates filtered out of the A "demineralized" coolant water in the storage pools. DOE's solution is to dilute the waste water so it does not appear to be a regulatory violation, even though the agency knows full well that dilution of a hazardous waste is a violation of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act. The Environmental Compliance Report states:
An effluent from regeneration of the ICPP [spent fuel storage pools] demineralizer system has not been adequately characterized to determine compliance with the [Land Disposal Regulations] LDR for underlying hazardous constituents (UHCs) [40 CFR 268.40(e)]. Since the demineralizer regeneration process creates D002 wastes, which are de-characterized through an elementary neutralization process [dilution] the effluent must be characterized for UHCs, which could be reasonably expected to be present in the waste. The effluent is discharged to the CPP Percolation Ponds. The sampling and analysis plan is currently out for review. In addition, the facility does not have a one-time LDR notification/certification [40 CFR 268.7 & 268.9(d)]. [pg. 2.2-25]
Facilities requiring [Wastewater Land Application Permits] WLAPs must be operated in accordance with the WLP regulations, permit applications, and operation and maintenance (O&M) manuals whether or not permits have been issued. Identified issues include the following: leaks and potential leaks in pond liners, wastewater lines, sumps and basins; inadequate controls to prevent improper discharge of hazardous or radiological substances to the WLAP facilities; and inadequate programs to ensure consistent operation, monitoring, and maintenance at WLAP facilities in accordance with permit requirements. Operational and maintenance concerns associated with inadequate operator training on O&M manual and permit requirements and inadequate maintenance of equipment were also identified. [2.4-3]
In violation of the law under IDEQ's nose, INEEL is building new unlined percolation ponds for use by 2004 to replace the old ones even though that violates a 1993 DOE Headquarters Order [5400.5] prohibiting the use of percolation ponds. The DOE/HQ safety report notes that INEEL management is not demonstrating any credible assurances that the new percolation pond will not be used for the same contaminate disposal as the old pond and thus create a new Superfund site. The DOE/HQ reports states:
"...the risks of contaminating a new soil column due to inadvertent contamination of this water have not been thoroughly reviewed or mitigated. There is a potential for service water to contaminate a soil column, which would require future environmental remediation Radioactively contaminated water is known to be inadvertently discharged through the service waste system. In addition, a small amount of residual contamination will remain in the lines following connection to the new percolation pond, and thus the discharges will continue to contain small concentrations of some radionuclides. Further, unmonitored release of radioactivity below the set point of process monitors could go undetected for a considerable periods (up to 60 days based on the monthly sampling frequency for service waste system discharges and the time required for analysis of samples), possibly contaminating a soil column."
Yet another looming problem with continued use of new percolation ponds is the "recharge" to
the existing contaminate plumes under and south of the ICPP. The Environmental Defense Institute
(EDI) has learned that the "approximate" location of the new percolation ponds is about two miles
southwest of the ICPP along the south bank of the Big Lost River. [ROD@11-24] It appears that the
new percolation ponds are directly above the existing heavily contaminated aquifer plumes created
by both the ICPP and the Test Reactor Area dumping in injection wells and percolation ponds.
[ROD@1-9] Recharge to these plumes of contaminated water in the perched water and deep aquifer
generates hydraulic pressure that drives the pollution deeper into the aquifer and further south toward
the Magic Valley. Even if the new percolation pond is not directly over the highly contaminated
perched water zones it will surely migrate laterally within the interbeds to merge with the existing
polluted water plumes and thus add to the hydraulic pressure to this highly contaminated water to the
aquifer. An example is the merging of the Test Reactor Area plume to the northwest with the ICPP
contaminate plumes. Despite what INEEL and state and EPA regulators say, groundwater
contamination at any level will eventually end up in the aquifer. No self-respecting hydrologist will
say, like EPA and State regulators are publicly claiming, that the contaminated perched water "dries
up." Ground water does not "dry-up" it migrates from unsaturated to deeper saturated zones carrying
the contamination with it.
Regardless of convergence of the polluted water plumes, INEEL's adding to an already
unconscionable contamination of the Snake River Aquifer must be stopped. The table below lists
other wastewater sources from the ICPP. Any additional dumping from all sources flushes those
contaminates further away from the site toward Idaho farms and homes. This represents a horrible
legacy to leave future generations. This discussion is germane to CPP-659/1659 flood issues by virtue
of the fact that if intentional discharges force the migration of contaminates, floods will only greatly
exacerbate the problem.
Waste Water from ICPP Adding to Loading/Recharge of Snake River Plain Aquifer
|
Source |
Volume (gal/yr) |
|
Service Waste Water (To Injection Well and Percolation Ponds) |
690,000,000 |
|
Sewage Treatment Ponds |
14,974,228 |
|
Water System/ Waste Line Leaks |
3,973,202 |
|
Landscape Irrigation (washing contamination off rock ground cover) |
1,299,470 |
|
Process Waste Steam Condensate |
1,668,327 |
|
Leaks from CPP-603 Reactor Fuel Storage Pools |
49,275 |
[DOE/ID-10660@5-4] [DOE/ID-22168@19]
Wells nearby at the Test Reactor Area register Tritium samples of 2,160,000 + 30,000 pCi/L. [DOE/ID-22129 @94] Plutonium-238 and 239/240 concentrations in the Aquifer ranged as high as 0.93 pCi/L and 0.51 respectively according to a 1999 USGS report. [DOE/ID-22159@51] These sample data from the USGS are considerably higher than DOE is recently publicly acknowledged 0.02 to 0.08 pCi/L.[Weapons Complex Monitor 3/19/01]
Two USGS reports released in September and October of 2000 confirm that continued use of ICPP injection wells for waste disposal leads directly into the aquifer as a major source of contamination. "The volumes of waste water discharged to the well and infiltration ponds during 1962-98 are shown in figure 10." The USGS report which states: "Routine use of disposal well discontinued, 1984, but does not quantify the continuing non-routine discharge rates to the injection well. "Annual discharge to the well and ponds ranged from 260 million gallons in 1963 to 665 million gallons in 1993 and averaged about 442 million gallons. The average annual discharge during 1996-98 was about 570 million gallons."[DOE/ID-22168@19]
Dumping in the injection well is also contaminating the perched water zones due to leaks in the injection well casing. According to USGS; "Perched ground water [contamination] also has been identified ... and may be attributed to other infiltration ponds, leaking wastewater lines, leach fields, ruptured casing in the upper part of the INTEC deep disposal well and landscape irrigation." [DOE/ID-22168@19 and 22167@22]
This USGS information challenges DOE's public statements that use of injection wells for waste disposal was discontinued in the mid 1980s. There are about thirteen waste injection wells on the INEEL site. Only one of the thirteen injection wells (CPP-23) was grouted closed in 1989; two injection wells at Power Burst Facility were capped. The other injection wells including CPP-50 remain usable presumably on a "non-routine" basis.
One might speculate what would constitute a "A non-routine" or what DOE has called "An emergency" use of the injection well where a process upset generated a waste stream that even after being diluted would set off radiation monitors once discharged to the percolation ponds. Perhaps in the interest of worker exposure, DOE would consider it expedient to dump the hot waste down the injection well. There is little doubt that was the "logic" of using the injection wells in the first place. "Out of sight, out of mind, and out of detection."
The State of Idaho and EPA must demand that all discharge lines to the injection wells be cut and capped. The well heads must also be capped and locked so the well can only be used for monitoring or if needed a pump and treat operation to remove contaminates.
INEEL's "mainlining" radioactive and chemical wastes directly into the aquifer justifiably outrages the public by continued use of percolation ponds and injection wells. What has come to the attention of Environmental Defense Institute is INEEL's use of "dilution is the solution for pollution" when one-tenth volume of contaminated process waste water is diluted by a nine-tenths volume of "clean" aquifer water before being dumping in the injection well or the percolation ponds. ICPP workers call it "flush water." Testing on the effluent occurs after dilution. This process of dilution is deliberate and constitutes an illegal effort to avoid regulatory restraints, which impose contaminate concentration limits. The Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) specifically prohibits dilution because the drafters of the statutes understood the propensity of polluters to avoid regulations via dilution. [40 CFR 268.3] There are nine active percolation ponds at INEEL, and the most heavily used ones are at ICPP, Central Facilities Area, Test Reactor Area, and Test Area North.
Groundwater Sample Data Near ICPP
|
Contaminate |
Snake River Aquifer (pCi/L) |
Perched Water Well (pCi/L) |
Water Standard (pCi/L) |
| Plutonium-238 | 0.93 | <15 |
| Plutonium-239/240 | 0.44 | <15 |
| Americium-241 | 0.54 | 0.16 | <15 |
| Iodine-129 | 3.82 | 1.0 |
| Strontium-90 | 84.0 | 320,000 | 8.0 |
| Technicum-99 | 448.0 | 740.0 | 900.0 |
| Tritium | 30,700 | 73,000 | 20,000 |
| Uranium-234 | 2.6 | 12 | 15.0 |
| Uranium-238 | 1.10 | 2.7 | 15.0 |
| Gross Alpha | 10.0 | 1,140 | 15.0 |
| Gross Beta | 469.0 | 590,000 | 4mR/yr |
[DOE/ID-10660, OU-3-13, ROD @5-61 & 5-70] [DOE/ID-22159@51] [DOE/EIS-0287D @ 4-64][Pico Curie per Liter (pCi/L)]
Test Reactor Area Perched Ground Water Sample Data
| Nuclide | Concentration pCi/L | EPA 1976
Standard pCi/L |
Number Times over EPA Standard. |
| Cobalt-60 | 12,200,000 | 100.00 | 122,000.0 |
| Zinc-65 | 105,000 | 300.00 | 350.0 |
| Cesium-134 | 62,400 | 8.13* | 7,675.0 |
| Cesium-137 | 21,000,000 | 119.0* | 176,470.0 |
| Europium-152 | 108,000 | 60.00 | 1,800.0 |
| Europium-154 | 130,000 | 200.00 | 650.0 |
| Europium-155 | 20,400 | 600.00 | 34.0 |
| Americium-241 | 16,700 | 6.34 | 2,634.0 |
| Chromium-51 | 2,540,000 | 6,000.00 | 423.0 |
| Iron-59 | 2,600 | 200.00 | 13.0 |
| Zirconium-95 | 11,500 | 200.00 | 57.5 |
| Niobium-95 | 12,000 | 300.00 | 40.0 |
| Ruthenium-103 | 3,970 | 200.00 | 19.8 |
| Rhodium-106 | 4,980 | 30.00 | 166.0 |
| Silver-108 | 14,400 | 90.00 | 160.0 |
| Cerium-141 | 6,140 | 300.00 | 20.4 |
| Ytterbium-175 | 3,500 | 300.00 | 11.6 |
| Hafnium-181 | 136,000 | 200.00 | 680.0 |
| Tantalum-182 | 3,180 | 100.00 | 31.8 |
| Plutonium-239 | 12 | 15.00 | 0 |
| Uranium-234 | 520 | 13.9* | 37.0 |
| Strontium-90 | 18,000 | 8.00 | 2,250.0 |
| Tritium | 3,940,000 | 20,000.00 | 197.0 |
[DOE/IDEQ/EPA Record of Decision, 12/92 Test Reactor Area Perched Water System] [Administrative Record, TRA Summary Tables of Chemical and Radiological Analysis, Appendix G-484 and 485, Analytica-ID-12782-1 @ D-615 to D-632] [EPA-570/9-76-003][1976 EPA Standard MCL is the current rule, a new proposed rule has not been promulgated because it has been found not to be protective] *[FR-7/18/91 Proposed MCL] Expressed in Pico Curies per liter (pCi/L)
The State of Idaho commissioned a limited study by Boise State University seismologist James Zollweg who found that "if a large earthquake struck, the biggest worry would be those tanks". Zollweg's assessment was endorsed by U.S. Geological Survey's Larry Mann who said, "that would be a catastrophic release. It couldn't be intercepted before reaching the aquifer". Zollweg calculated that, "if an earthquake of 7 on the Richter scale hit the fault closest to the tanks, a ground acceleration of about 0.24 G could hit the vaults". [Statesmen (b)] A catastrophic risk exists with these forty-year-old tanks which DOE refuses to address. The tanks are 400 feet above the Snake River Plain Aquifer that provides drinking water for over 275,000 Idahoans. Scientists also believe that if the tanks fail, then the acids in the tanks will react with the concrete in the vaults and release large amounts of radioactive gases into the atmosphere. DOE contends that a spare tank is available in the event a problem arises; waste can be transferred to the spare tank. This contingency relies heavily on there being not more than one tank failure, that the service lines needed to pump out the failed tank remain intact, that the pump capacity is sufficient to remove the waste in minutes, and that operators can respond quickly in a multiple event accident scenario. DOE's 1993 assessment shows that the tank service lines could not survive greater than 0.18 g and the pumps to transfer the waste to another tank can only deliver 50 gallons/minute. [DOE/EA-0831] That means it would take 100 hours to transfer 300,000 gallons assuming the transfer lines survive. This does not qualify as a credible rapid emergency response to prevent tank contents from leaking into the ground.
Of particular concern is the long-term reliability of tanks WM-185, 187, and 188, whose corrosion rate is "definitely increasing". [ENICO-1131 @ 19] The 9,000 feet of underground piping used in transfer of radioactive waste does not meet RCRA standards for continuous secondary containment. Some lines are encased in concrete. "The concrete encasement is found in the immediate vicinity of valve boxes and around about 5% of the underground piping." [Ibid. @ 2] According to the General Accounting Office these underground pipes have leaked substantial quantities of high-level waste to the ground. [GAO/RCED/91-56] Also in March 1962, two tanks discharged to their vaults due to poorly designed service lines. Twelve INEEL tank or waste line leaks are documented through 1976. [ERDA-1536@II-79] DOE is currently replacing some of these service lines.
The tanks also do not meet Resource Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) requirements for secondary containment of hazardous wastes. "A Notice of Noncompliance was issued on January 29, 1990 by the EPA because the secondary containment (concrete vaults) is subject to attack by the acidic solutions stored in the tanks", and "the pillar and panel construction style of the vaults has insufficient seismic resistance." [Spent Fuel Plan @ 8&11] (72) Indeed, the 30,000 gal. tanks do not even have any vaults or secondary containment. In 1995, these un-vaulted tanks were emptied and taken out of service.
The vaulted tanks also support 10 feet of earth plus a 12,000 pound concrete structure for radiation shielding of the vent pipes. That puts the bottom of the tank over 32 feet in the ground generating considerable earth loads. In an earthquake scenario, a collapsing vault would compound the stresses on the weak tanks and add to the likelihood of a total tank failure. The integrity of the vaults and their ability to hold the tank contents if it ruptured is further challenged because five of the 11 (300,000 gal.) tanks get water "in-leakage" that must be periodically pumped out. (73) [ERDA-1536@II-79]
The State Oversight Program recently disclosed that an average of more than 2,400 gallons per month were pumped from the concrete vaults enclosing the high-level waste tanks. This compares to a maximum of 100 gallons per year that normally would be expected to seep into the tank vaults. [Oversight 92 @ 17] Another uncertainty is how much of the 2,400 gallons pumped out of the vaults is tank leakage and how much is ground/surface water migration into the vaults.
"Major discrepancies were discovered between recorded volumes of water pumped from the aquifer for [ICPP] production use when compared with water used and disposed or lost from February 1990 to December 1990. Approximately 20 million gallons were unaccounted for in June 1990 alone."..."Since 1988, water level in a perched body of water approximately 370 feet below the tank farm rose nearly six feet. Measurements were taken in a well about 500 feet southwest of the tank farm." [Oversight 92] ERDA documents show a long history of tritium plume migration under the ICPP. In 1960 the plume registered 1,000,000 pCi/L and was expected to migrate 12 miles south of the boundary. [ERDA@III-69] Significant spills and leaks have frequently occurred over INEEL's history. "Most spills have been the result of line and tank failures, leaking valves, and equipment and tank overfilling. [Spill and/or leak] volumes range up to 45,000 gal.." [DOE/EH/OEV-22-P,p.3-166] DOE sources cite that high-level tank wastes can range in concentration between 12,000 Ci/gal or 5 million Ci per batch [IDO-14532 @18&23] to 25,000 Ci/gal. [IDO-14414] One gallon is equal to 3.79 liters. Converting the previous concentrations to metric would be 3,166.22 Ci/L and 6,596.3 Ci/L respectively. Plutonium concentrations can reach 30 millicurie of alpha activity per liter. [Ibid @ 13] There is no doubt that these figures characterize an extremely radioactive witches brew which when released to the environment via leaks represents a significant hazard.
References (in addition to footnoted citations):
US Department of Energy, Office of Independent Environmental Health and Safety Oversight, Focused Safety Management Evaluation of INEEL, January, 2001. Reference to DOE Order 5400.5 is the Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment Order relating to phasing out existing soil column discharges at DOE sites.
DOE/ID-22168; Distribution of Selected Radiochemical and Chemical Constituents in Perched Ground Water, INEEL, Idaho, 1996-98, U.S. Geological Survey Water Resources Investigations Report 00-4222, October 2000
DOE/ID-22167; Hydrologic Conditions and Distribution of Selected Constituents in Water, Snake River Plain Aquifer, INEEL, Idaho 1996 through 1998, U.S. Geological Survey, Water Resources Investigations Report 00-4192, September 2000.
DOE/ID-22159; Chemical Constituents in Ground Water from 39 Selected Sites with an Evaluation of Associated Quality Assurance Data, INEEL and Vicinity, Idaho, U.S. Geological Survey Open File Report 99-246, August 1999.
DOE/ID-10660; Final Record of Decision, Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, Operable Unit 3-13, October 1999. Also referred to as "ROD" above.
INEL-96/0389, Environmental Compliance Inventory of the INEL, Volume I ECI Results December 1996, INEL-96/0389, Lockheed Martin.
EDI would like to acknowledge technical contribution and review by David McCoy in the preparation of this Amicus Brief.
Respectfully Submitted
Chuck Broscious
Executive Director
Environmental Defense Institute
Attachment A
David McCoy Appellant Brief (January 11, 2002)
Note that the attachments to the McCoy brief are not included here but are available upon request
Attachment C
AMICUS BRIEF Re: Floodplain issues at CPP- 659
David B. McCoy
2940 Redbarn Lane
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
V 208-542-1449
F 208-552-0565
Sent via Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to:
Administrative Hearing Coordinator
Department of Environmental Quality
1410 N. Hilton
Boise, ID 83706
and
Office of Counsel
U. S. Department of Energy
785 DOE Place
Idaho Falls, ID 83402
Before the Director of the
Idaho Department of Environmental Quality
AMICUS BRIEF FROM KEEP YELLOWSTONE NUCLEAR FREE
IN THE MATTER OF THE )
HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT ) ORDER GRANTING LIMITED
AND STORAGE PARTIAL ) REVIEW OF PERMIT
) Docket No 10HW-HW-0109
PERMIT FOR UNITS AT INEEL )
BLDG. CPP 659 ) IDAPA 58.05.013 [40 CFR SS 124.19]
)DAVID B. McCOY, ) PETITIONER )
Thank you for the opportunity to provide our commentary on Flood Hazards at CPP-659. Keep Yellowstone Nuclear Free (KYNF) is a Wyoming 501c3 corporation, representing public interests from Idaho, Wyoming, and the United States at large. KYNF has been active in analyzing activities at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), particularly those activities found within the Big Lost River (BLR) floodplain.
Upon analysis of the relevant floodplain and engineering documentation submitted by the Department of Energy (DOE), DOE contractors, and the United States Geological Survey (USGS) we have information that we feel would assist the agency in it's determinations.
The following are our comments:
The DOE has, after essentially two decades of non-compliance, finally submitted some limited documentation regarding the 100-year floodplain for the Volume 18 Resource and Conservation Recovery Act (RCRA) Part B application. This documentation is, and has been, a requirement of 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., 40 CFR 264.18(b), 40 CFR §270.14 et seq.; the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq.) and the accompanying Council on Environmental Quality Regulations (42 U.S.C. § 1500 et seq.; and, the Floodplain/Wetlands environmental review requirements of 10 CFR 1022 et seq.), as well as requirement of the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations.
This submission was never presented to the public that we are aware of, and our organization is on all of the relevant DOE and IDEQ mailing lists. This DOE floodplain submission by itself is deserving of public hearing and commentary, as it links numerous facilities and specific overlapping laws that have never been addressed by DOE in any comprehensive fashion.
The DOE, with EPA's concurrence, considers INEEL as a single entity for permitting. The actions at INEEL fall under NEPA directly or under RCRA's functional equivalency of NEPA requirements (see above and 1991 FFCA), yet the public has not been given an opportunity to address this information.
In summary, the DOE has apparently failed to follow the floodplain laws and denied the public a formal opportunity to review what floodplain documentation does exist. The documentation, which has been provided ex post facto on the RCRA Volume 18 is deeply flawed and incomplete.
Therefore, KYNF requests that no further permits be issued, and initiates review of existing permits, for any and all activities within the 100-year flood or the 500-year "critical floodplain" until DOE completes a full site-specific floodplain analysis of all the affected reaches of the BLR, and a full public review is completed.
Please feel free to contact the undersigned if you have any questions or comments.
Sincerely,
Erik Ringelberg
Executive Director
DETAIL OF CONCERNS
IDAPA 58.01.05.012 and 40 CFR § 270.14(b)(11)(iv) require owners and operators of facilities within the 100 year flood plain to provide: (1) engineering analysis to indicate the various hydrodynamic and hydrostatic forces expected to result at the site as a consequence of a 100 year flood, and (2) structural or other engineering studies showing the design of operational units and flood protection devices at the facility and how these will prevent washout. Flooding must be considered from "any source," which would require consideration of both riverine and overland flow.
Problem: The engineering and other mitigation measures to withstand washout are either incomplete or non-existent. The DOE documents that the building was never intended to be protective from washout. Instead, the information provided by DOE is speculative and incomplete in regards to the actual building construction and to presence/design of any mitigative structures.
Problem: Two types of flooding need to be addressed, both the Big Lost River overtopping its banks and surface flooding (overland flow) from snow or rain on snow events. The facilities have to have demonstrable protection from both kinds of flooding; they do not. This problem with surface flooding was clearly identified in the July 6, 2000 letter from INEEL to Mr. Bullock of IDEQ. Yet, the sole analysis by the DOE regarding surface flooding is incomplete at best (see detailed comments).
Problem: The CPP659, the tank farm, the PEWE/HLWE/etc. are all located within the same documented 100-year floodplain. The cumulative impact of numerous extremely hazardous facilities documented in the same floodplain, represent an unreasonable risk and require a full-EIS to quantify the real risks. The DOE cannot on the one hand assert that INEEL is a single facility for permitting, while on the other hand providing only information on a site by site basis, ignoring the interaction of other facilities within INEEL. Executive Order 11988, supplementals, and 10 CFR 1022 are intended to place "critical actions" outside of the 500-year floodplain, yet this is apparently ignored completely.
IDAPA 58.01.05.012 and 40 CFR § 270.13 (2)(l) and 40 CFR § 270.14 (b)(19) require a topographic map that "…describes each of the intake and discharge structures; each of its hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facilities; each well where fluids from the facility are injected underground, and those wells springs and other surface water bodies and drinking water well listed in the public record or otherwise known to the applicant…(.)"
Problem: The IDEQ has documented numerous of shallow wells that go directly into the vadose zone, and at least one into the deep aquifer at INTEC. Most of these wells are not presented in the figures provided by DOE. IDEQ also apparently has no record of permanent legal closure for the deep injection well (and most of the shallow wells) and documents numerous wells (undisclosed by DOE in the permit application) at INTEC.
Even if the buildings have some permanent barrier (which has not been demonstrated in any of the documents disclosed by DOE) towards the river, barriers can actually trap contaminated water and drain it down the wells. This is not even discussed by the DOE, even though it is the likeliest flood contamination scenario. This is also a requirement of IDAPA 58.01.05.012 and 40 CFR § 270.14 (b) (8)(ii and iii) and 40 CFR § 270.14 (b) (11) (B) (iii).
Problem: Modeling of flooding is insufficient and based on unsupported assumptions.
The DOE states repeatedly in the permit application that RCRA does not require a 100-year flood elevation that includes the failure of Mackay Reservoir, and therefore essentially any flood elevation that is provided is automatically exceptionally conservative. The failure of Mackay Reservoir during a 100-year flood is accepted by all investigations. RCRA does not specifically state that likely dam failure must be analyzed, but that is certainly within the intent of RCRA to avoid catastrophic contamination of the environment during a reasonably expected occurrence.
The DOE has apparently intended to evade floodplain requirements by selecting a flood elevation from an old preliminary report (EGG-EP-7184 Koslow and Van Haaften, 1986) that specifically states that the report is not a high resolution review of flood elevations (pg. 29) and that it uses numerous assumptions of unknown reliability and accuracy (pg. 29). If that were not enough to urge extreme caution in its application, there is no indication that the DOE has implemented any of the recommendations from the report.
It is clear from the sheer number of floodplain reports commissioned by the DOE, that they are attempting to fund new reports until they get the assessment that they want. Why has the DOE waited until 2002 to fund any comprehensive floodplain report, after two decades of evading the law and even DOE criticism (INEEL Tiger Report DOE EH-0178; Finding SW/CF-10, pg. 3-109)? It is unreasonable for DOE to submit partial and "interim" data in lieu of the required floodplain analysis. Furthermore, the DOE intends to use the least credible Federal agency to do the 2-dimensional analysis, and will only use the USGS as a subcontractor in the assessment. This is a two decade mockery of good science.
IDEQ has also identified some of the problems of this same document in its letter dated February 12, 2001, regarding the DOE's January 18, 2001 EDF. The DOE response to the above cited IDEQ 2/12/01 correspondence stated: "DOE-ID and BBWI have determined the USGS 1998 report is not to be used for RCRA permitting." There is no legitimate reason to either the DOE or IDEQ ignore the numerous floodplain reports that followed the 1986 report simply because they dispute the DOE's assertions of the floodplain elevation.
The DOE has apparently attempted to obfuscate the issue of imprecise and inappropriate elevations by statements of "interim" flood elevations (from permit text and map legend). Even if the EGG-EP-7184 report had been used in an appropriate manner, which the DOE has not, the elevation used in the report is missing its uncertainty value (+/-), which greatly influences the selection of a conservative 100-year flood elevation that should be used in a permit. For example, at the very least the DOE should use the +/- 1.5' error figure (pg. 29) added to the modeled 100-year flood elevation of 4916', making the elevation 4917.5'. Moreover, there is no DOE analysis of the appropriateness of using a report that is clearly speculative, and essentially discredited by another office of the DOE (INEEL Tiger Report DOE EH-0178; Finding SW/CF-10, pg. 3-109).
The EGG-EP-7184 report clearly identifies that it is a preliminary assessment of a complex flooding problem. The report also clearly identifies a number of assumptions and uncertainties that would vary the specific flood elevation at a given location a considerable distance. The report does fail to explicitly provide those uncertainties in the tabular presentation of the data. However, this failure of the authors does not excuse the DOE from misusing that table value.
If there is any doubt as to the speculative nature of this report it is valuable to look at the elevations for flooding at INTEC (ICPP or CPP). These elevations are presented as being virtually identical regardless of the volume and kind of flooding event (Seismic, 100 piping, 500 piping, and Probable Maximum Flood {PMF}[PMF is 1 ft greater]). This seems a result of the a priori study design covering only a few flood models. For example, why is the trapezoidal dam failure considered solely for a 25-year flood event and an earthquake and a PMF?
Would not a piping failure lead rapidly to a trapezoidal failure?
Why is the volume loss estimation much larger than the cited Teton Dam failure? What analysis concludes that there are topographical differences to justify this wild assertion?
Not suprisingly, the EGG-EP-7184 report hides the likely Probable Maximum Flood in Appendix
B. There are several potential PMFs, depending on the assumptions made by the modeler. The
only reasonable PMF, by definition, is a rain on snow event in the BLR watershed. These are
events that happen with regularity in the intermountain region west of INEEL. The flow value
provided in Appendix B for this PMF is 137,500 cfs, more than double the flow for a 100-year
piping failure as described in the same document. The only "conservative" estimate for a 100-year flood would use this flow value, with appropriate error ranges.
Regardless of the substance of the report and the apparent misuse of even incomplete data, the
use of the elevation data at the INTEC site leads to even greater concerns about the validity of the
information submitted by the DOE.
Site specific Problem: A water depth of 4' at the edge of building CPP-659 was chosen based on an DOE "extrapolation" of localized flood elevations. The 4' elevation is not based on two-dimensional modeling of estimated actual flow responses around complex topography, as used by the United States Geologic Survey for this specific purpose. There is no need for the INEEL to speculate about this elevation, ignoring the fact that 4' elevation used by INEEL would be the minimum expected elevation given the data, and not a conservative estimate.
Site specific Problem: Engineering construction practices for building CPP-659 were shown by INEEL not to conform to watertight standards, and documented by INEEL to leak under ordinary circumstances. Secondary systems appear to be in place to deal with a fixed amount of leakage from outside of the building, but that was never their intended purpose.
The INEEL surface water flow modeling again attempts to document the likelihood of surface erosion, yet this documentation is superficial and unsubstantiated.
I. Modeling
A. Flood level
Modeling is insufficient and based on unsupported assumptions. For example, a water depth of 4' at the edge of building CPP-659 was chosen based on an extrapolation of localized flood elevations. The 4' elevation is not based on two-dimensional modeling of estimated actual flow responses around complex topography, as used by the United States Geologic Survey (USGS) for this purpose. There is no need for the INEEL to speculate about this elevation, ignoring the fact that 4' elevation used by INEEL would be the minimum expected elevation given the data, and not a conservative estimate.
B. Waves
The issue of wind-generated waves is apparently lacking any form of analysis of the wave height at the side of the structure, and how that wave height would influence the success in the so called "flood protection devices.
Page 6/13 of the INEEL report (EDF 1747) uses a 2-foot wave height for wind-induced waves. This wave height is drawn from an undisclosed source and no support for it's selection or degree of conservatism is provided. Further, the assumption of 2-ft change from peak to trough seems un-conservative in a real world condition of water driven against a building by wind. Even if the values can be supported, the estimates of wave height and pressure must include the sum of the flooding and the wind wave effects.
II. Engineering
A. Qualification
The Professional Engineer certification for the Engineering Design File (EDF) is dated 1/17/2001, is this certification for the EDF itself or the referenced, but uncited "field investigation"?
B. Walls
Engineering construction practices for building CPP-659 were shown by INEEL not to conform to watertight standards, and documented by INEEL to leak under ordinary circumstances. Secondary systems appear to be in place to deal with a fixed amount of leakage from outside of the building, but that was never their intended purpose.
INEEL's statement that silicone caulking will be used to mitigate for the documented leaks into the building is spurious at best (See also July 6, 2001 letter). What is the lifespan of this silicone? What is its resistance to pressure…when applied properly? When applied on one side of a crack under moist conditions? How will the condition of the caulk and cracks be monitored over time? It is hardly conservative to assume perfect sealing (and maintenance) of cracks and therefore refuse to model maximum seepage rates.
Since the building design has not been documented, and insufficient or no maintenance by the DOE has occurred with the cracks, how can the public trust that the building will be secure from run-on/off once the permit is issued?
The INEEL report (EDF 1747) describes the structure as concrete, 1.3'-2' foot thick, with no visible cracks in the exterior above grade, and visible, leaking cracks below grade. It is inconceivable that this partial visual assessment can be considered a sufficient assessment; particularly in light of the cracks discovered. Why was an actual destructive test from samples from representative portions of the foundation not completed? There is no value to placing assumption upon assumption when an actual engineering test would define the actual conditions.
The assumptions stated in the report are apparently reject the statements made following them: the flood height of 4' (pg. 6/13), with a 3' above grade first level (pg. 7/13), apparently contradicts statement "4" on pg. 7 "The first level is at an elevation higher than the flood water elevation." Does this mean that the building is on a berm over 1'? Was there an actual survey of elevations or is this a guess? Are there any doorways or vents from ground level to 4'?
The "exterior retaining walls" are of varying thickness (pg. 7/13). How is this known? Since apparently these walls were poured at different times, what engineering feature is in place to avoid seepage/leakage between floors (castings)? Has this been verified visually?
C. Penetrations
If the area is flooded, how will the INTEC utility tunnel (since it has several surface openings) not convey very large volumes of water directly into the second floor, and then down into the first floor? How will this not short out the electrical wiring and shut down the pumps?
What water pressure would be required to cause the inner cell 3" line seal to fail (pg. 8/13)? Has this "seal" ever been tested?
If the tank system at the lowest level of the facility is intended to be used in case of a flood, what is the estimated volume of infiltrated water, over what period of time?
D. Lateral pressure
Lateral earth pressure is assumed to act by itself, not in concert with wave action. It is unjustified to isolate these two issues when it is obvious that they will occur at the same time. This renders all the calculations for beam loading incomplete, if not moot. The force of the wave action acting at the top of the exposed 3' second level and the force exerted by saturated soils will be greater than the presented figures. (The text is confusing in the final paragraph pg. 8/13.)
Why is the loading assumed to be uniform? This makes the calculated results significantly lower than if the loading is considered for the far likelier top loading from either just saturated soils or from the combination of wave loading and surface saturated soils. What would the forces be under a rotational force scenario?
Is there not a defacto rotational loading problem since the calculations use the 14' wall length instead of the actual 17' for the middle floor, and completely ignore the lowest level with a 17' foot wall length? It thus appears that there is some obfuscation in the development of the assumptions.
Shouldn't the entire 17' wall length be considered, as should the 34' cumulative length? Are the walls not connected structurally and thus would act as one member? If there is a clay interbed just below the foundation, as stated (pg. 10/13), then the entire wall length needs to be considered.
It also appears that the calculated results are incorrect, as stated, for the shear force and bending moment "analysis:"
"M" and "V" are presented as being the product of (H)eight=14, using (P)ressure=89.6 x H = 1254 [significant digit rounding error in text].
The resulting M is 20,335 rather than the 6,690 presented in the text:
if P= 89.6 x H (14) = 1,254; M=PL^2/12 = P (1,254) x L (14)^2/12. The same discrepancy exists for V.
So, it appears that there is either an additional, undisclosed conversion/formula or the math itself has not been properly calculated.
III. Erosion
A. Sheer Stress
The actual velocities and height of surface water need to be modeled in two dimensions, as is the USGS protocol. One-dimensional models that do not include roughness are overly simplistic. It is clear from the data that limited scouring of paved surfaces will occur, but that conversely overall flow velocities will remain higher than they would otherwise, leading to extreme localized scouring at obstructions and changes in surface type.
One of the problems with relying on one-dimensional data is that it cannot reflect the likely (but uncalculated) jamming of bridges and culverts can redirect water in complex and unpredictable ways, changing both the depth and velocity of the flood flow. These variables may change the effect of flooding in both positive and negative ways. These can only be estimated using an adequate two-dimensional model with accurate data.
The influence or impact of scouring on the main foundations is unclear given the paucity of relevant data. However, it is clear that the shallow subsurface structures are at some risk of inundation and even destruction. Electrical conduits, power poles, telephone and site piping are all at risk. Of particular concern, is the potential of the INTEC utility tunnel flooding the middle and lowest levels and potentially weakening the foundation for the entire building. None of these issues are addressed by DOE in the documentation provided.
Attachment E
Koslow, K.N., Van Haaften, D.H., Flood Routing Analysis for a Failure of Mackay Dam, June 1986, EG&G Idaho Inc. Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho Operations Office, page 9. Hereinafter referred to as Koslow (1986). Mackay's Yesterdays, p. 92, Georgia Olsen, Printed by the Arco Advertiser, 1978. "First, a tentative hypothesis may be made that Mackay Dam may be overtopped and fail due to floods of not much greater recurrence interval than that of the maximum floods considered in the paper [15 to 300-year recurrence intervals]." Carrigan, P.H., Jr., Probability of Exceeding Capacity of Flood-Control System at the National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho, U.S. Geological Survey, Open-File Report, TID-4500, January 1972, pg. 18, IDO-22052. Koslow (1986), page 1, citing, State of Idaho, Department of Water Resources, Phase I Inspection Report, National Dam Safety Program, Mackay Dam, September 1978. June 22, 1933, Mackay Miner newspaper. Koslow (1986) page 26 Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and INEEL Environmental Impact Statement, Vol.2, Part A, page 2.2-23, April 1995, DOE/EIS-0203F. Hereinafter referred to as INEEL Site-Wide EIS. "The need for flood control at the INEL [sic] has been recognized since the early 1950's when the Test Reactor Area and the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant were threatened by localized flooding that occurred because of ice dams in the Big Lost River." "Repeated threats of flooding in the late 1960's, early 1970's, and early 1980's occurred when the Big Lost River filled Playas 1 and 2 and overflowed into Playa 3 near the Loss-of-Fluid Test facility. High stream-flow and air temperatures as low as -47 degrees F in the winter of 1983-84 caused ice jams that imposed a danger of localized flooding." (Bennett, C.M., Capacity of the Diversion Channel Below the Flood-Control Dam on the Big Lost River at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory [sic], Idaho, U.S. Geological Survey, Report 86-4204, October 1986, page2.) 1/18/2001 Response to the Department of Environmental Quality Request for Additional Floodplain Information for Units Defined in the Volume 18 HWMA/RCRA Part B Permit Application for the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, "Response" --also referred to hereinafter as Engineering Design File (EDF-1747) or EDF.
10. CCN 00-010826- 7/6/2000 Compliance Schedule for Volume 18-Floodplain Requirements.
11. USGS(1998) page 6
12. Koslow (1986) page 26, table 7
13. Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Draft Environmental Impact Statement, December 1999, page 4-51, DOE/EIS-0207D, hereinafter referred to as HLW/EIS. Also see, Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho
14. The four scenarios are: 1.Seismic failure of the dam, coincident with the 25-year recurrence interval flood; 2. Hydraulic (piping) failure of the dam, with the 100-year recurrence interval flood; 3. Hydraulic (piping failure), with the 500-year recurrence interval flood; and 4. Overtopping failure caused by the probable maximum flood (PMF) (#4 scenario is used in the HLW/EIS). Scenarios 1,2 and 3 assumed a failure time of over one hour. This is a significant factor related to flood elevations down stream from the dam due to longer release duration of the Mackay Dam backwaters. The fourth Mackay Dam failure assumes a near immediate Mackay Dam failure due to overtopping, and a trapezoid opening of the dam. "The PMF represents the hypothetical flood that is considered to be the most severe flood event reasonably possible, based on hydrologic factors." "The PMF is based on the maximum potential for critical hydrometerological conditions to occur, not on probabilities or historical flood frequencies." (Koslow, p.14).
15. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Reducing Risk Through Mitigation. www.fema.gov/mit/idf_iiib.htm
16. Roland, John, PG, Hasemeier, Robert, PE, Gannet Fleming, Inc., Memorandum to Wayne Pierre, Environmental Protection Agency, Region 10, Site Visit: INEEL ICDF construction, October 25, 2001, page 2.
17. USGS (1998) citing Shearman, J.O. 1990, Users's manual for WSPRO - a computer model for water surface profile computations: U.S. Department of Transportation, 177 p., report No. FHWA-IP-89-027.
18. Kjelstrom, L.C, Berenbrock, C., Estimated 100-Year Peak flows and Flow Volumes in the Big Lost River and Birch Creek at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho, U.S. Geological Survey, Water Resources Investigations Report 96-4163, p. 9, 1996.
19. Berenbrock,C., Kjelstrom L.C., Preliminary Water-Surface Elevations and
Boundary of the 100-Year Peak flow in the Big Lost River at the INEEL, U.S. Geological
Survey, Water Resources Investigations Report 98-4065, DOE/ID-22148. Hereinafter referred to
as USGS (1998)
20. USGS (1998) page 9
21. USGS (1998) page 8 to 10
22. INEEL 7/6/00 letter to R.E. Bullock IDEQ, subject: Compliance Schedule for Volume
18 - Flood-plain Requirements: Attached: Flood plain Requirements for the Volume 18 of the
RCRA Part B Permit Application for the INEEL - Compliance Schedule, page 1.
23. Koslow (1986) page B-22
24. Final Record of Decision, Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, Operable
Unit 3-19, October 1999, DOE/ID-10660. Herein after referred to INTEC ROD. Also see
INTEC Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study ( INEEL-95/0056 page 162) that shows
strontium-90 contaminate plumes at 516,000 pCi/L (CPP well # MW-2) and 110,000 pCi/L (CPP
well # MW-5). The EPA established maximum concentration level for strontium-90 is 8 pico
curies per liter (pCi/L).
25. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (42 USC § 4321 et seq.) Also
see 10 CFR Part 1021, Clean Air Act, as amended (42 USC § 7401 et seq.), The Clean Water
Act, as amended (33 USC § 1251 et seq), The Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended (42 USC §
300f et seq.), Resource Conservation Recovery Act, as amended (42 USC § 6901, et seq.),
Federal Facilities Compliance Act, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, as amended (42 USC § 9601 et seq.), Emergency Planning and Community Right to
Know Act of 1986 (42 USC ss 11001 et seq.), Toxic Substances Control Act (15 USC § 2601 et
seq.), Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 USC § 13101 et seq.), Executive Order 11990 and
11988 (Floodplain Management) that require Federal agencies to establish procedures to ensure
that the potential effects of flood hazards and floodplain management are considered for any
action undertaken in a floodplain and that floodplain impacts be avoided to the extent practicable.
DOE Order 5400.1, General Environmental Protection Program requires compliance with
applicable Federal, State, and local environmental protection laws and regulations as well as
internal DOE policies.
26. Focused Safety Management Evaluation of the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Independent Environment,
Safety, and Health Oversight, January 2001, page 25 and 50.
27. Preliminary Design Report for the [ICDF] Staging, Storage, Sizing, and Treatment
Facility (Draft), section 1.1, December 1, 2000, DOE/ID-10825. "All SSSTF activities shall take
place within the WAG-3 area of contamination (AOC) to allow flexibility in managing the
consolidation and remediation of wastes without triggering Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR's)
and other RCRA requirements, in accordance with the OU-3 ROD."
Also see, Comprehensive Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, ICPP OU3-13, Part B,
FS Supplement Volume 2, October 1998, DOE/ID-10619. "Materials removed from CERCLA
activities within the INTEC facility fence and disposed in the ICDF will be within the AOC.
Therefore, these CERCLA generated materials can be disposed at the ICDF without triggering
placement or RCRA land disposal restrictions. Materials generated on the INEEL from CERCLA
activities outside of the WAG 3 AOC would be subject to substantive requirements of RCRA,
including LDR treatment and disposal restrictions." page C-6.
28. USGS (1998) page 6
29. McHugh,J.A., Knief, R.A., and Robkin, M.A., Nuclear Criticality Safety Issues
Pertaining to the INEEL [Subsurface Disposal Area] SDA, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Region 10, May 3, 2000, page 2. Also see, EPA 1/25/01 letter to K.E. Hain, DOE/ID,
Comments on Subsurface Disposal Area Nuclear Criticality Issues Meeting Minutes, 12/6-8/00.
30. Also see INEEL Response to IDEQ Comments (5/18/01) comment #4 that provides an
inadequate response. "The pump identified in the previously submitted EDF is located in the
utility tunnel which is outside the foundation wall of Building CPP-659. No pump is used within
Building CPP-659 to transfer seepage water, and the application of the sealant will prevent
seepage through the pipe penetrations. Therefore, no pump capacity information nor engineering
certification is required." With the tunnel at the bottom of the third level (34' below the surface
and a flood level of an additional four feet) considerable hydrostatic pressure will be on the
silicone sealant and other pipe barriers in CPP-659. DOE is obliged to offer certified engineering
approval of this tenuous silicone barrier as well as the sump pump capacities should the silicone
fail.
31. 1st. Level Floor and [Foundation] FDN Plan Decontamination Area New Waste
Calcine Facility, Drawing No. 1495-CPP-659-C-314, Flure Construction, Los Angles, CA for
U.S. Energy R&D Administration, 1977. Drawing is also numbered 132465.
32. RCRA Part B Application for the INEEL, Volume 18 Idaho Nuclear Technology and
Engineering Center Book 2, March 1996, USDOE, DOE/ID-10131, page D-18.
33. See Memorandum fn. 14, supra, "The implication of the presence of these fist sized
sediments is that the Big Lost River has, in its past, produced high energy environments of
erosion and deposition in the area of the present landfill excavation. The river would have to have
left its current channel and carved through the adjacent overbank deposits with sufficient force to
carry and then deposit cobbles greater than 3 to 4, and some up to 6 inches, in diameter.
Significant water volumes and velocities are required to produce high energy deposits comprised
of gravels and cobbles of this size range."
34. Amicus Curiae, "Law. Literally, a friend of the court: hence, in practice, a party who
suggests or states some matter of law for the court's assistance." Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary, page 29
35. Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs
Final Environmental Impact Statement, April 1995, Volume 1, Appendix B, page 4.8-3,
DOE/EIS-0203-F.
36. Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, December 1999, page 4-51, DOE/EIS-0207D, hereinafter referred to as HLW/EIS.
37. Mendelsohn, M.L, Final Report of the Director's Internal Panel on the
Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF), Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Livermore, CA, February 21, 1990.
38. Focused Safety Management Evaluations of the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory, Office of Independent Environment, Safety and Health Oversight,
U.S. Department of Energy, January 2001.
39. Bennett, C.M., Capacity of the Diversion Channel Below the Flood-Control Dam on
the Big Lost River at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory [sic], Idaho, U.S. Geological
Survey, Report 86-4204, October 1986, page2.
40. See INEEL website citing Environmental Science and Research Foundation reports,
(www/Stoller-eser.com/Flora.INEEL.html)
41. Roland, J, PG, Hasemeier, R., PE, Gannet Flemming Inc., Memorandum to Wayne
Pierre, USEPA Region 10, Subject Site Visit: INEEL ICDF Construction, October 25, 2001.
42. Response to the Department of Environmental Quality Request for Additional Flood-plain Information for the Units Defined in the Volume 18 HWMA/RCRA Part B Permit
Application for the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, January 18, 2001,
Attached Hydrodynamic and Structural Analyses of Flood Hazards at the CPP-659 During a Peak
Flow in the Big Lost River, Engineering Design File # EDF-1747, Revision O, Effective Date
12/01/00, Titled "Hydrodynamic and Structural Analyses of
Fflood Hazards at the CPP-659 During a Peak Flow in the Big Lost River, Bechtel BWXT Idaho.
LLC. Hereinafter referred to as EDF-1747, or simply EDF.
43. EDF-1747, citing: K.N. Koslow and D.H. Van Haaften, "Flood Routing Analysis for a
Failure of Mackay Dam," EGG-EP-1784, June 1986. Herein referred to Koslow (1986).
Hereinafter referred to Koslow (1986)
44. Idaho High-Level Waste and Facilities Disposition, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, December 1999, DOE/EIS-02087D, page 4-51, and 5-44. Hereinafter referred to
HLW/EIS
45. HLW/EIS, page 5-44
47. Kjelstrom, L.C., Berenbrock, C., Estimated 100-Year Peak Flows and Flow Volumes in
the Big Lost River and Birch Creek at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, U.S.
Geological Survey, Water-Resources Investigations Report 96-4163, page 9, 1996.
48. Bennett, C.M., Capacity of the Diversion Channel Below the Flood-Control Dam on
the Big Lost River at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory [sic], Idaho, U.S. Geological
Survey, Report 86-4204, October 1986, page2.)
49. Carrigan, P.H., Jr., Probability of Exceeding Capacity of Flood-Control System at the
National Reactor Testing Station, Idaho, U.S. Geological Survey, Open-File Report, TID-4500,
January 1972, pg. 18, IDO-22052.
50. Preliminary Water-Surface Elevations and Boundary of the 100 Year Peak Flow in the
Big Lost River at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho, US
Geological Survey, Water-Resources Investigations Report 98-4065, DOE/ID-22148
51. Topographic Map of Block 21, National Reactor Testing Station (now called INEEL)
showing works and structures, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Idaho Operations Office,
Drawing Number B21-100-IDO-1, shows three feet change in elevation between the north and
south end of the ICPP.
52. Estimated 100-Year Peak Flows and Flow Volumes in the Big Lost River and Birch
Creek at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Idaho, U.S. Geological Survey, Water-resources Investigations Report 96-4163, L.C. Kjelstrom and C. Berenbrock, 1996, page 9.
Herein after referred to USGS (1996)
53. Preliminary Water-Surface Elevations and Boundary of the 100 Year Peak Flow in the
Big Lost River at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Idaho, US
Geological Survey, Water-Resources Investigations Report 98-4065, DOE/ID-22148
54. USGS 98-4065, page 8
55. Charles E. Berenbrock, U.S. Geological Survey Hydrologist, March 25, 1999 email to
Chuck Broscious
56. Estimated 100 Year Peak Flows and Flow Volumes in the Big Lost River and Birch
Creek at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, U.S. Geological Survey, Water Resources
Investigations Report 96-4163, page 11 shows flow rates for 5-year, 10-year, 100-year, and 500-year floods
57. Flood Routing Analysis for a Failure of Mackey Dam, K. Koslow, D. Van Hafften,
prepared by EG&G Idaho for U.S. Department of Energy, June 1986, EGG-EP-7184, page 15
58. USGS (1998) page 6
59. USGS (1998), page 6
60. Capacity of the Diversion Channel Below the Flood Control Dam on the Big Lost River
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, US. Geological Survey Water Resources
Investigations Report 86-4204, 1986, C. M. Bennet, page 1 and 25. Herein after called USGS
(1986)
62. USGS (1986) page 19
63. AMWTP HWMA/RCRA Treatment Permit, Attachment 1, Revised December 21,
2001, page 18 and 19.
66. Moriarty, T. P., Feasibility of Locating Dry Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel on Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory Land at a Site That Does Not Overlie the Snake River Aquifer,
November 1995
67. For a detailed analysis of this project see the Environmental Defense Institute's
69. Roland, J. PE, Hasemeier, R. PE, Gannet Fleming Inc., Memorandum to Wayne Pierre,
EPA Region 10, Subject Site visit: INEEL ICDF construction, October 25, 2001.
70. Makhijani, A, Boyd, M., Poison in the Vadose Zone: An Examination of the Threats to
the Snake River Plain Aquifer from the INEEL, October 2001, page 56.
71. Focused Safety Management Evaluation of the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory, January 2001, page 25 & 26, U.S. Department of Energy Office of
Independent Environment, Safety, and Health Oversight.
72. Spent Nuclear Fuel Plan; Draft Idaho Chemical Processing Plant Spent Fuel and Waste
Management Technology Development Plan, April 24, 1992, U.S. Department of Energy , Idaho
Operations Office.
73. Waste Management Operations, INEL Final Environmental Impact Statement, U.S.
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) predecessor to the USDOE,
September 1977